Punctuated Equilibrium: A Model for Administrative Evolution by Niles, Mark
American University Washington College of Law 
Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of 
Law 
Articles in Law Reviews & Other Academic 
Journals Scholarship & Research 
2011 
Punctuated Equilibrium: A Model for Administrative Evolution 
Mark Niles 
American University Washington College of Law, mniles@american.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/facsch_lawrev 
 Part of the Accounting Law Commons, Administrative Law Commons, Civil Rights and Discrimination 
Commons, Securities Law Commons, and the State and Local Government Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Niles, Mark, "Punctuated Equilibrium: A Model for Administrative Evolution" (2011). Articles in Law 
Reviews & Other Academic Journals. 1182. 
https://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/facsch_lawrev/1182 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Scholarship & Research at Digital Commons @ 
American University Washington College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Articles in Law Reviews & 
Other Academic Journals by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ American University Washington 
College of Law. For more information, please contact kclay@wcl.american.edu. 




In 1972, paleontologists Niles Eldredge and Stephen Jay
Gould published a paper that challenged the conventional
understanding of the nature and rate of biological evolution.'
Addressing the absence of support in the fossil record for the
accepted model of species change, the scholars observed that
significant genetic development within a single species did not
appear to follow the kind of gradual path that Charles Darwin had
postulated.2 Instead, they concluded that "the great majority of
species appear with geological abruptness in the fossil record and
then persist in stasis until their extinction."3 They observed that
species evolution is much more often the product of dramatic
quantum shifts over relatively short periods of time, than the kind
of gradualism envisioned by Darwin.4 Eldredge and Gould referred
to the evolutionary structure produced by this phenomenon as a
"punctuated equilibrium"5-long periods of relative stasis
("equilibrium") interrupted and re-defined ("punctuated") by rare
but dramatic instances of evolutionary change. 6 They referred to
* Dean and Professor of Law, Seattle University School of Law. B.A.,
Wesleyan University, 1988; J.D., Stanford University, 1991.
1. N. Eldredge & Stephen J. Gould, Punctuated Equilibria: An Alternative
to Phyletic Gradualism, in MODELS IN PALEOBIOLOGY 82-115 (Thomas J.M.
Schopf ed., Freeman, Cooper & Co. 1972).
2. The theory of Evolution, proposed first by Charles Darwin in the mid-
nineteenth century revolutionized the study of the origin and development of
humans and other species on this planet. The theory rested on three facts that
Darwin observed as irrefutable: overproduction of offspring, variation, and
heritability, and one inference from these facts "that organisms, enjoying
differential reproductive success will, on average, be those variants that are
fortuitously better adapted to changing local environments, and that these
variant will then pass their favored traits to offspring by inheritance."
STEPHEN JAY GOULD, THE STRUCTURE OF EVOLUTIONARY THEORY 13 (The
Belknap Press of Harvard Univ. Press 2002); STEPHEN JAY GOULD, DINOSAUR
IN A HAYSTACK: REFLECTIONS IN NATURAL HISTORY 320 (Three Rivers Press
1995).
3. GOULD, THE STRUCTURE OF EVOLUTIONARY THEORY, supra note 2, at
749.
4. See id. at 148 (discussing Darwin's "gradualist" theory).
5. Id. at 774.
6. Id. at 752.
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the relatively brief (in geological terms) periods where the normal
stasis in species development is interrupted by dramatic species
developments as "unresolvable geological moments."7 This theory,
more fully developed in Gould's later work, was controversial from
its inception,8 but nonetheless, has revolutionized the study of
biological evolution, and remains a central topic of debate to this
day.9
In their synthesis of the public discourse concerning the
punctuated equilibrium theory, editors Albert Somit and Steven
Peterson argued that the model, "[b]y providing a different
metaphor for explaining social phenomena . . . may assist us in
better understanding human behavior in all of its
manifestations."10 Aware of similar assessments of the efficacy of
his theory, Gould did not "question the widespread invocation or
the extensive utility of the metaphorical linkage,"" but confessed
to being "more interested in exploring ways in which the theory
might supply truly causal insights about other scales and styles of
change." 12
One field outside the natural sciences where causal insights
can be gleaned from the basic logic of the punctuated equilibrium
theory1 3 is the study of administrative regulation. Specifically, the
7. Id. at 779.
8. For a discussion of the decades of debate that the punctuated
equilibrium theory has fostered, see THE DYNAMICS OF EVOLUTION: THE
PUNCTUATED EQUILIBRIUM DEBATE IN THE NATURAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCES
(Albert Somit & Steven A. Peterson eds., Cornell Univ. Press 1989).
9. The death of Stephen Jay Gould in 2002 prompted a spate of articles
discussing the efficacy of the punctuated equilibrium theory. See, e.g., David B.
Wake, On the Scientific Legacy of Stephen Jay Gould, 56 EVOLUTION 2346
(2002); Stephen C. Stearns, Less Would Have Been More, 56 EvOLUTION 2339-
45 (2002); William F. Zimmerman, Stephen Jay Gould's Final View of
Evolution, 78 Q. REV. BIOLOGY 454-59 (2003); Francisco J. Ayala, The
Structure of Evolutionary Theory: On Stephen Jay Gould's Monumental
Masterpiece, 3 THEOLOGY & SCI. 97-117 (2005); STEPHEN JAY GOULD, THE
RICHNESS OF LIFE: THE ESSENTIAL STEPHEN JAY GOULD (Paul McGarr &
Steven Rose eds., W. W. Norton & Co. 2007); Kenneth W. Krause, Exquisite
Complexity Revisiting Stephen Jay Gould, 67 HUMANIST 10 (2007); P.Z. Myers,
A Short Sharp Slice of Evolutionary History, NEW SC., May 12, 2007, at 54.
See generally DAVID F. PRINDLE, STEPHEN JAY GOULD AND THE POLITICS OF
EVOLUTION (Prometheus Books 2009).
10. THE DYNAMICS OF EVOLUTION: THE PUNCTUATED EQUILIBRIUM DEBATE
IN THE NATURAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCES, supra note 8.
11. See GOULD, THE STRUCTURE OF EVOLUTIONARY THEORY, supra note 2,
at 976-79 (discussing the various fields in which the punctuated equilibrium
theory has been invoked, including economics, political theory, sociology,
history, literary criticism, art history, and cartooning).
12. Id. at 952.
13. As one scholar put it:
Though developed in the physical and biological sciences, analyzing
phenomena as complex dynamic systems has proven very productive in
the social sciences as well. Within the past decade or so, there have been
354 [44:353
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theory provides a compelling template for an analysis of the
historical development of administrative and regulatory structures
in the United States.14 Political scientists have already relied on
the punctuated equilibrium model to explain the volatile pace of
policy innovation,15 particularly in the environmental area,16 the
nature of American constitutional development,17 and other
aspects of political and governmental change.18 Some legal
scholars have noted the apt analogies that can be drawn between
Eldredge and Gould's theory and analysis of the evolution of
regulatory regimes in the area of securities regulation 9 and other
fields.20
hundreds of applications in economics and finance, which have shed
light on market-price fluctuations, oligopolistic behavior, business
cycles, and other economic phenomena. Studies of business behavior and
organizational change have also made considerable use of this analytical
approach.
Robert Repetto, Introduction to PUNCTUATED EQUILIBRIUM AND THE
DYNAMICS OF U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 1, 9 (Robert Repetto ed., Yale
Univ. Press 2006).
14. Id. at 8. In describing the phenomenon of stability and occasional
discontinuous change, political scientists have borrowed a term from
evolutionary biology: punctuated equilibrium. Id.
15. See id.
16. See Frank R. Baumgartner, Punctuated Equilibrium Theory and
Environmental Policy, in PUNCTUATED EQUILIBRIUM AND THE DYNAMICS OF
U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY, supra note 13, at 25 (discussing the use of
punctuated equilibrium to help understand environmental policy-making).
17. See Walter Dean Burnham, Constitutional Moments and Punctuated
Equilibria: A Political Scientist Confronts Bruce Ackerman's We the People,
108 YALE L.J. 2237, 2250-51 (1999) (discussing the application of the
"punctuated equilibrium alternative" to political science); see also Rivka Weill,
Evolution vs. Revolution: Dueling Models of Dualism, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 429,
464 (2006) (referencing Professor Ackerman's agreement that his theory "is
that of punctuated equilibria").
18. See Burnham, supra note 17, at 2250 n.28.
19. See, e.g., Joseph A. Grundfest, Punctuated Equilibria in the Evolution of
United States Securities Regulation, 8 STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 1 (2002) ("[t]here
can, however, be no doubt that 'punctuated equilibrium' is a stunningly
accurate description of the evolution of United States securities laws").
20. In the course of noting the role that "powerful organizations" have
played in discouraging "aggressive measures to control greenhouse gas
emissions," Professor Cass Sunstein recently makes reference to the work of
Lee Lane in Political Science scholar Robert Repetto's volume PUNCTUATED
EQUILIBRIUM AND THE DYNAMICS OF U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY, supra note
13. See also Edward Lee, The Public's Domain: The Evolution of Legal
Restraints on the Government's Power to Control Public Access Through
Secrecy or Intellectual Property, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 91, 172 (2003). Also, in a
piece assessing the impact of "catastrophes" on "risk regulation," former
Nuclear Regulatory Commission official Eric Pogue noted that the government
"reacts with a flurry of responses to the risk that caused the catastrophe" and
that, over time, "regulatory advancements often fail to develop along a steady,
straight-line trajectory, but instead occur in sporadic leaps, which correspond
to notable catastrophes." Eric R. Pogue, The Catastrophe Model of Risk
2011]1 355
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This Article attempts to reconcile theories of administrative
structure and function with the observable realities of the
administrative state. It describes the change in the scope and
nature of administrative governance 21 in light of the dominant
theoretical model for administrative governance-the "public
choice" theory. 22 Much like the dramatic shifts in relevant
ecosystems that result in significant evolutionary development in
the natural world, significant shifts in administrative development
are often the product of dramatic public events that alter the
existing power, resource, and interest equilibrium (compellingly
described by public choice theorists) that otherwise mandate long
periods of regulatory status quo. Indeed, while Eldredge and
Gould's theory provided an explanation for the phenomenon of
"stasis" that appeared to belay Darwin's accepted gradualism
thesis, this Article will demonstrate how the relative frequency of
development of new administrative regimes (particularly those
that at least ostensibly serve some articulable version of the broad
"public interest") can be understood within a public choice
framework that describes governmental policy-making structures
as inextricably tied to, and controlled by, intransigent private
interests.
The argument is that some dramatic events, commonly
observed and productive of the right kind of public narrative, serve
to alter, if only briefly, the static dynamics that allow for private
interest "capture" of legislative and regulatory entities. 23 The key
to the domination by private interests of these regulatory and
legislative entities is that the broad public interest in regulating a
Regulation and the Regulatory Legacy of Three Mile Island and Love Canal, 15
PENN ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 463, 465 (2007).
21. For a discussion of the historical development of the administrative
state in the late-nineteenth and twentieth centuries, see Robert L. Rabin,
Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1189 (1986).
22. "Thus, starting in the 1970's and accelerating into the 1980's and
1990's, the law school world has seen political science and economics
perspectives supplemented by critical legal studies, the civic republican
revival, feminist theory, critical race theory, postmodernist theory, libertarian
political theory, and so forth. Not surprisingly, normative administrative law
scholarship has drawn on these alternative intellectual perspectives to develop
various rivalrous conceptions of the proper role of administrative common law,
which academics have then urged on the courts." Thomas W. Merrill, Capture
Theory and the Courts: 1967-1983, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1039, 1067-68 (1997).
23. For a discussion of the conditions that allow for change in
administrative governance, see JOHN W. KINGDON, AGENDAS, ALTERNATIVES,
AND PUBLIC POLICIES 165 (Longman, 2d ed. 2002) (using the concept of a
"policy window," which is "an opportunity for advocates of proposals to push
their pet solutions, or to push attention to their special problems."). Policy
windows, according to Kingdon, open for a variety of reasons, including "a
change of administration, a shift in the partisan or ideological distribution of
seats in Congress, or a shift in national mood . . . ; or . . . because a new
problem captures the attention of governmental officials . . ." Id. at 168.
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certain industry is never as strong or focused as the interest of
those most directly affected by any changes in regulatory policy. 24
The parties most directly affected by any regulation are likely to
be regulated entities and not the "public." Given the structure of
our legislative and administrative rulemaking mechanisms, the
interests of the regulated parties will invariably win any
regulatory policy battle against advocates for the broad public
interest because the private interests will be more forcefully and
effectively communicated to the regulatory body.25
Regulatory bodies will invariably have little, if any, real
choice but to implement policy judgments produced in a process
dominated to the point of exclusion of contrary perspectives by the
entities they are tasked to regulate. 26 Barring a shift in the kind of
consistent objectives of private entities, this kind of regulatory
process is likely to produce a static and consistent set of regulatory
demands (or lack thereof) on the private entities, allowing
dominant actors to perpetuate the favorable conditions that have
fostered their ascendancy.27
Dramatic eventS28 can intensify public focus on particular
24. See, eg., GABRIEL KOLKO, RAILROADS AND REGULATION 1877-1916, 2-3
(Princeton Univ. Press 1965) (providing observations about the role played by
railroad interests in the development of regulation for their industry).
25. See Mark C. Niles, On the Hijacking of Agencies (and Airplanes): The
Federal Aviation Administration, 'Agency Capture," and Airline Security, 10
AM. U. J. GENDER Soc. POL'Y & L. 381, 387-88 (2002) ("once a relatively small
group of government officials is given substantial authority to make an enforce
policy decisions . . . that group is likely to be subjected to extensive pressure
from groups that have a particularly strong interest in the consequences of its
policy determinations.").
26. See, e.g., Bradford C. Mank, Superfund Contractors and Agency
Capture, 2 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 34, 34 (1993) (discussing agency capture with
respect to the EPA); Dion Casey, Agency Capture: The USDA's Struggle to
Pass Food Safety Regulations, 7 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 142, 142 (1998).
27. Jonathan Remy Nash states:
Although it retains a focus on the actions and demands of interest
groups, public choice theory does not suggest that government actors
will be oblivious to, or act blithely contrary to, the broadly held wishes of
their constituents. Ultimately, for legislators and executives, it is the
electorate who decides whether they will remain in power. The question
remains how public opinion may reach and influence politicians. First, it
is conceivable that 'voters sometimes exercise influence in ways that
bypass interest groups.' Second, public choice theory recognizes the
possibility that public opinion on an issue will be enlisted by 'political
entrepreneurs.' Political entrepreneurs harness latent public sentiment
to achieve particular goals ....
Jonathan Remy Nash, Economic Efficiency Versus Public Choice: The Case of
Property Rights in Road Traffic Management, 49 B.C. L. REV. 673, 682 (2008).
28. See Lawrence M. Friedman & Joseph Thompson, After Disaster: The
September 11th Compensation Fund and the Future of Civil Justice, 53
DEPAUL L. REV. 251 (2003) (discussing the legal responses to various
disasters).
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policy questions, however, and enhance the possibility that the
inherent advantages enjoyed by private regulated entities in the
process of policy-generation can be reduced. Change under these
circumstances is most likely to occur, and to have a lasting impact,
when a cohesive, yet nascent, political movement at odds in some
relevant way with the dominant private-sector interest is already
in place, poised to take advantage of the altered perceptions
fostered by the dramatic event(s) and their accompanying
narrative.
The terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, for example,
produced a measurable federal regulatory response including
changes in law enforcement policy and procedure29 and the
imposition of new structures and requirements on the airline
industry of a kind consistently and unsuccessfully proposed for
decades by powerful, well-organized, consumer and safety
activists.30 The marked shift in policy by the Federal Aviation
Administration resulted as much from the dominant post-
September 11th narrative that the attacks were the result of holes
in airline safety regulations,3' and the subsequent political
mechanisms that magnified the political influence of this broadly-
shared belief,32 as from the horrific events themselves. 33
But the events of September 11 are not the first dramatic
public instance that helped usher significant regulatory
development. Many substantial administrative evolutionary
changes in the twentieth century can be tied to dramatic public
events that played a critical catalyzing role within a fertile
political context. In each instance, the dominant public narrative
arising from the events was conducive to this change, and post-
event political structures were formed that provided the kind of
29. See, e.g., John T. Parry, Terrorism and the New Criminal Process, 15
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 765, 766 (2007) ("the 'war on terror' has accelerated
the development of a new criminal process and . . . this new process has
increasingly displaced traditional methods of investigating, prosecuting, and
punishing people who have engaged in conduct that is subject to criminal
penalties-whether or not the conduct is considered 'terrorism'. . . ."). See also
Anne Joseph O'Connell, The Architecture of Smart Intelligence: Structuring
and Overseeing Agencies in the Post 9/11 World, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1655, 1655
(2006) (providing more background).
30. See Niles, supra note 25 (noting the challenges faced by such activists).
31. Id. at 382-83.
32. THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL
CoMMIssION ON TERRORIST ATAcKS UPON THE UNITED STATES 348 (2010),
available at http://www.9-1lcommission.gov/report/9llReport.pdf.
33. Eric G. Behrens, Note, The Triangle Shirtwaist Company Fire of 1911:
A Lesson in Legislative Manipulation, 62 TEX. L. REV. 361, 372-73 (1983)
("Before change can occur, reformers must overcome the normal resistance to
reform by creating an environment that is favorable to their program.
Disasters produce such an environment. History shows that they are
frequently the cause of important social change.").
[44:353358
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focus and power that could offset the inherent advantages
otherwise enjoyed by the dominant regulated entities.34
Part II of this Article provides a survey of major theoretical
approaches to the administrative state and its development. It
provides a brief summary of the "public interest" theory, and
moves on to discuss "public choice" theory and its critique of the
prior model. 35 It notes the conceptual power of public choice
theory, but observes the lack of a readily apparent explanation for
regulatory change in the stasis-predicting model.
Part III offers an explanation for the phenomenon of
regulatory evolution employing the punctuated equilibrium theory
as a model. Dramatic events, under the right circumstances, can
serve to energize and focus the political will of enough of the
general population (and enhance the political power of advocates
for the "public interest") to undermine the advantages usually
enjoyed by regulated entities and relieve their stranglehold on
regulatory entities enough to allow for genuine regulatory change.
Part IV focuses on just two of these evolutionary events,36 two
34. See id. at 373 (arguing that a disaster only creates the potential for
change and that interested parties must still advocate for reforms).
35. See Joseph P. Tomain, The Past and Future of Electricity Regulation, 32
ENVTL. L. 435, 444 (2002) ('Theories of, or justifications for, government
regulation can be characterized in two basic ways. The first characterization is
called public interest theory, in which natural monopoly, or other market
imperfection, is controlled for the delivery of a reliable service or good in the
public interest. The second characterization of government regulation is
private interest group or public choice theory, which holds that government
regulates at the behest of, and for the benefit of, the regulated industry rather
than for the public.").
36. It is important to emphasize that one can see instances of the
substantial impact of dramatic events on the development of administrative or
governmental structures in other areas not discussed at length in this Article.
Scholars have discussed numerous other disasters, whether natural or man-
made, which, to some extent, have had a profound impact on regulatory
development. See, e.g., Steven M. Davidoff & David Zaring, Regulation by
Deal: The Government's Response to the Financial Crisis, 61 ADIVMN. L. REV.
463, 466 (2009) (analyzing the government's response to the financial crisis of
2009 and arguing that the government developed a "dealmaking" approach to
the crisis); Pogue, supra note 20 (proposing a model called "the Catastrophe
Model of Risk Regulation" and using the case studies of the Three Mile Island
nuclear disaster and the Love Canal chemical spill to highlight how such
catastrophes turn the deliberate and slow-moving regulatory process in the
United States on its head, resulting in risk regulation proceeding in a series of
jumps rather than along a continuum); Lawrence M. Friedman & Joseph
Thompson, Total Disaster and Total Justice: Responses to Man-Made Tragedy,
53 DEPAUL L. REV. 251, 252-56, 263-69, 276-85 (2003) (examining how events
such as the Johnstown Flood, Sinking of the Lusitania, Coconut Grove Fire,
and Texas City Disaster of 1947, changed federal policy regarding fault and
compensation); Robert V. Percival, Regulatory Evolution and the Future of
Environmental Policy, 1997 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 159 (1997) ("Reviewing the
history of occupational health, Henry Selleck notes that 'the biggest steps
toward protection of life and limb have stemmed from the greatest tragedies-
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"unresolvable regulatory moments," (akin to Eldredge and Gould's
unresolvable geological moments): the Triangle Shirtwaist Factory
fire in New York in 1911 and the Mississippi River flood of 1927,
in order to flesh out a punctuated equilibrium model for regulatory
change. It compares these events and their impact to another
disaster during the same period, the explosion and fire in the coal
mine at Monongah, West Virginia in 1907, that did not foster a
measurable change in the status quo for regulation of the relevant
industry. The comparison illustrates the dynamics that give rise to
identifiable "punctuations" in the often static course of
administrative regulatory development and those that do not.
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF ADMINISTRATIVE THEORY
Much like creationist theologians, the proponents of the
public interest administrative theory (and the related "civic
republican" approach 3') posited a benevolent, morally-driven
structure for the administrative state. The dominant critique of
this theory, much like Darwin's response to traditional theology-
based explanations for the development of life, applied a rigorous
empirical analysis to an assessment of administrative entities, and
ultimately rejected the notion of a morally-centered and
a war, a holocaust, a disaster that rouses human indignation and starts a
public clamor for drastic action.' Dan Farber accounts for the ability of
legislators to enact environmental laws that appear to overcome collective
action problems by using the concept of 'republican moments.' The history of
environmental law seems to suggest that Congress and the EPA respond to
perceiving crises that demand public attention: for example, CERCLA was
enacted in response to Love Canal and other incidents generating widespread
public concern over uncontrolled hazardous waste sites; the origins of the
Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act can be traced back to
the Bhopal tragedy; and the Exxon Valdez oil spill broke more than a decade
of legislative gridlock and produced the Oil Pollution Act of 1990.").
37. For a discussion of the differences between public interest and civic
republican theories, see Steven P. Croley, Theories of Regulation:
Incorporating the Administrative Process, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 16 (1998)
(noting that while the civic republican theory "contemplates that those
[participants in the regulatory decision making process] exhibit a certain
amount of public-spiritedness," the theory nonetheless "rejects the public-
choice, interest group, and public-interest premise that regulatory decision
making in one way or another involves simply preference aggregation). It
holds instead that regulatory decision-making can, should, and to some extent
does involve the identification of shared regulatory values-of what those with
a stake in a decision ultimately come to prefer. Id. On this account, collective
judgments about regulatory priorities and policies are identified following a
process of dialogue and deliberation among all interested parties, during the
course of which those parties settle upon a decision roughly constituting a
consensus about the appropriate course of regulatory action, given all
concerns." Id. See generally Jack Van Doren, Environmental Law and the
Regulatory State: Postmodernism Rears its "Ugly" Head, 13 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J.




essentially altruistic system.38 The "public choice" theorists
identified, instead, the individualistic nature of the development of
both administrative structures and policies.39 These theorists
explained how powerful entities dominated the mechanisms for
policy production and used those mechanisms to serve their
individual needS40 as opposed to some version of the broad public
good.41
A. Public Interest Theory
The growth in the national regulatory regime, beginning in
earnest at the turn of the twentieth century, initiated in depth
theoretical assessment of its form and function. The critical
formative moment in this development is generally identified as
the creation of the first modern independent federal agency, the
Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC), in 1887.42 The creation of
38. As Mackay, Miller and Yandle observe, public choice analysis of
administrative and legislative function can be distinguished from its public
interest counterpart by reference to the rigorous and scientific notion of the
public choice theory. PUBLIC CHOICE & REGULATION: A VIEW FROM INSIDE THE
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION 3-4 (Robert J. Mackay et al. eds., Hoover Inst.
Press 1987).
39. For example:
The public choice theory of regulation analogizes regulatory decision-
making to market decision-making. Specifically, it treats legislative,
regulatory and electoral institutions as an economy in which the
relevant actors-including ordinary citizens, legislators, agencies, and
organized interest groups most affected by regulatory policies-
exchange regulatory 'goods,' which are 'demanded' and 'supplied'
according to the same basic principles governing the demand and supply
of ordinary economic goods. ... Simply stated, the regulatory interests
of the individual voter (or consumer) are dominated by the regulatory
interests of organized subgroups of the citizenry because the latter have
incentives to influence regulatory decision[]making which the former
lacks.
Steven P. Croley, supra note 37, at 34.
40. See Jill E. Fisch, The "Bad Man" Goes to Washington: The Effect of
Political Influence on Corporate Duty, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1593, 1611 (2006).
41. See Daniel Shaviro, Beyond Public Choice and Public Interest: A Study
of the Legislative Process as Illustrated by Tax Legislation in the 1980s, 139 U.
PA. L. REV. 1, 31 (1990) ("In contemporary law and economics literature, the
public interest theory of legislation is little more than a strawman. Writers
describe it as an old-fashioned and now universally rejected school of economic
thought, discuss it very briefly, and then move on the real (public-choice
based) discussion."); see also Michael E. Levine, Why Weren't the Airlines
Regulated?, 23 YALE J. ON REG. 269, 269 n.1 (2006) ("This theory is known as
the 'public choice' theory of regulation. .. . It is usually contrasted with the
'public interest' theory of regulation, which posits that regulation is brought
about by public-spirited government actors (legislators or administrators) to
serve as a public corrective for inefficiencies and/or injustices brought about by
market imperfections or failure of market outcomes to conform to social
norms.").
42. See B.H. Meyer, The Past and the Future of the Interstate Commerce
2011] 361
The John Marshall Law Review
the ICC marked the first time "a national legislative scheme was
enacted that provided for wide-ranging regulatory controls over an
industry that was vital to the nation's economy-the railroads."43
While the era was dominated by a broad faith (at least among
legislators) in the value of "an autonomous market-controlled
economy . . . [,] adherents to this view were willing to concede that
the market systematically generated certain 'excessively
competitive' practices . . . [and that] when these practices occurred
repetitively . . . [it] constituted a nationwide problem."44 Many
parties, including most private sector interests, favored national
regulation over the "ad hoc approach" 45 of "judicially fashioned
common law and statutory regulatory practices." 46
With the ICC, and the perceived need for consistency it
fostered as a template, 47 Congress expanded the federal regulatory
sphere to cover food and drugs, commercial competition, shipping,
electricity generation, commodity trading, and radio
communication between 1906 and 1927.48 Much of the scholarly
Commission, 17 POL. Sci. Q. 394, 394-437 (1902) (analyzing the early history
of the Interstate Commerce Commission).
43. Rabin, supra note 21, at 1189.
44. Id. at 1192.
45. KOLKO, supra note 24, at 4 ("In formulating a program designed to cope
with the unpredictable threat of control by the various states, and to protect
themselves from their competitors or large shippers demanding expensive
rebates, most railroad men approached the issue of regulation with purely
opportunistic motives.").
46. Rabin, supra note 21, at 1192. "[A] weaker model of government
intervention based on common law tort and property principles was the
prevalent form of 'regulation,' along with sporadic state and local controls,
before the Commerce Act." Id.
47. See generally Meyer, supra note 42, at 394 (analyzing the early history
of the Interstate Commerce Commission); see Richard Stillman, II, The
Constitutional Bicentennial and the Centennial of the American
Administrative State, 7 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 4, 5 (1987) (stating that the creation
of the administrative state was essential to carry out "vital and complex
tasks"); Samuel P. Huntington, The Marasmus of the ICC: The Commission,
the Railroads, and the Public Interest, 61 YALE L.J. 467, 470 (1952) (providing
a history of the Interstate Commerce Commission); see also Eliza Wing-yee
Lee, Political Science, Public Administration, and the Rise of the American
Administrative State, 55 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 538, 544 (1995) (discussing the rise
of the administrative state in the nineteenth century in response to structural
changes in economic and social conditions); but see Paul P. van Riper, The
American Administrative State: Wilson and the Founders-An Unorthodox
View, 43 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 477, 478 (1983) (arguing that an American
administrative state first emerged between 1789 and 1829).
48. RONALD A. CASS ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAw: CASES AND MATERIALS 4
(4th ed., Aspen Publishers 2002). For an early public interest era analysis of
the administrative state, see Woodrow Wilson, The Study of Administration, 2
POL. SCI. Q. 197, 201 (1887) (emphasizing that, due to societal changes
engendered by the Industrial Revolution, a new "science of administration"
emerged to systematically execute policy and "straighten the paths of
government, to make its business less unbusiness-like, to strengthen and
362 [44:353
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analysis of these new administrative agencies "tended to view
[them] and their statutory mandates as isolated phenomena, each
a tailor-made response to a unique social problem."49 Early'studies
of the administrative state focused on two main issues: the legal
basis for the assertion of administrative and executive authority
and the judicial remedies available for those allegedly harmed by
the exercise of this power.50
The expansion of the administrative regime during the New
Deal era51 prompted the passage, in 1946, of the Administrative
Procedures Act, a set of rules applicable to all federal agencies that
governed both the mandatory regulatory procedures and the
nature and extent of judicial review of agency action.52 This
expansion in federal regulatory authority, along with the creation
of a set of rules that applied to a wide range of government entities
in a similar way, also fostered a new scholarly focus that took a
more systematic approach than that of scholars of the previous
generation.53
purify its organization, and to crown its duties with dutifulness.").
49. CASS ET AL., supra note 48 at 4.
50. Id. at 5.
51. See Gary M. Anderson & Robert D. Tollison, Congressional Influence
and Patterns of New Deal Spending, 34 J.L. & ECON. 161, 161-64 (1991)
(observing that the rise of federal nonmilitary spending began with the New
Deal and that, in the decades before the New Deal, federal nonmilitary
spending ranged from twenty-five to thirty-four percent of all federal
spending, and that by 1937 just over half of federal spending was devoted to
nonmilitary spending); see also Richard S. Kirkendall, The New Deal as
Watershed: The Recent Literature, 54 J. AM. HIST. 839, 840 (1968) (noting that
the population of Washington, D.C. grew from 63,000 in 1933 to 166,000 in
1940 due to the increase in size of the federal government); Thomas Ferguson,
Industrial Conflict and the Coming of the New Deal: The Triumph of
Multinational Liberalism in America, in THE RISE AND FALL OF THE NEW
DEAL ORDER, 1930-1980 3-4 (Steve Fraser & Gary Gerstle eds., Princeton
Univ. Press 1990) (describing the "burst" of regulatory legislation in the first
100 days of the President Roosevelt's time in office).
52. CASS ET AL., supra note 48, at 5.
53. For example:
[T]he public interest theory of administrative governance ... emerged as
the dominant approach to regulation at the height of the New Deal and
its immediate aftermath. Its earliest advocates were Louis Brandeis,
Charles Francis Adams, and John M. Landis. Landis's ideas about
public interest regulation of railroads later were generalized by many
scholars as well as Supreme Court Justices who promoted public
interest administrative governance after having contributed to the
building of New Deal institutions earlier in their careers.
Anthony E. Varona, Toward A Broadband Public Interest Standard, 61
ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 11 (2009). See also Glendon A. Schubert, Jr., 'The Public
Interest" in Administrative Decision-Making: Theorem, Theosophy, or Theory,
51 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 346, 348-49 (1957) (characterizing the early ideal of the
"administrative man" as a "robot" due to the scholars' emphasis on making
administrative decisions based upon "efficiency"-i.e., "maximiz[ing] the
attainment of the governmental objectives . .. 'by the efficient employment of
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The new theorists evaluated administrative agencies and
their regulatory and policy initiatives in terms of their impact on
the development and protection of the "public good."5 4 The defining
assertion of the approach was that administrative agencies were
distinguished from other governmental entities by the scientific or
other relevant expertise of their officials.55 While there was no
guarantee that the agencies would produce some measurable net
product of public good in any given instance of regulation, it was
generally assumed by the commentators that "agency zeal in
advancing the unalloyed, nonpolitical, long-run economic interest
of the general public would be assured by the professionalism of
administrators or by political mechanisms through which the
administrative branch would eternally refresh its vigor from the
stream of democratic desires."56
. . . limited resources") (quoting HERBERT A. SIMON, ADMINISTRATIVE
BEHAVIOR: A STUDY OF DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES IN ADMINISTRATIVE
ORGANIZATION (1947)); Frank J. Sorauf, The Public Interest Reconsidered, 19
J. POL. 616, 618-24, 633 (1957), (summarizing various conceptions of the
"public interest," as well as an analysis of the historical factors that have
contributed to the term's "popularity and strength" in American politics).
54. See Frank Michelman, Political Markets and Community Self
Determination: Competing Judicial Models of Local Government Legitimacy,
53 IND. L.J. 145, 148-49 (1978) ("The . . . public-interest model depends at
bottom on a belief in the reality . . . of public or objective values and ends for
human action. In this public-interest model the legislature is regarded as a
forum for identifying or defining, and acting towards those ends."); see
generally R. H. Coase, The Lighthouse in Economics, 17 J.L. & ECON. 357, 357-
59 (1974) (analyzing the example of a lighthouse as a public good-a good or
service that the government must provide because such goods and services are
necessary to the community but which the private market cannot provide at
reasonable costs or sufficient quantities) (citing PAUL A. SAMUELSON,
ECONOMICS: AN INTRODUCTORY ANALYSIS 45 (6th ed. 1964)); see also Vincent
Ostrom & Elinor Ostrom, Public Choice: A Different Approach to the Study of
Public Administration, 31 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 203, 206-07 (1971)
(distinguishing public and private goods but discussing how a public choice
theorist perceives public goods).
55. See Mark Seidenfeld, Bending the Rules: Flexible Regulation and
Constraints on Agency Discretion, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 429, 452 (1999)
("[A]gencies are given broad regulatory power because they have professional
expertise and the capability to implement technical regulatory requirements.
In particular, the delegation of decision making to agencies is premised at
least in part on their ability to collect and analyze information and to
understand the technical issues relevant to the decisions agencies face."); see
also ALAN BRINKLEY, The New Deal and the Idea of the State, in THE RISE AND
FALL OF THE NEW DEAL ORDER, 1930-1980 92 (Steve Fraser & Gary Gerstle
eds., Princeton Univ. Press 1990) (noting that the New Dealers of the 1930's
believed in "a common vision of government-a vision of capable, committed
administrators who would seize command of state institutions, invigorate
them, expand their powers when necessary, and make them permanent forces
in the workings of the marketplace").
56. Richard Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88
HARV. L. REV. 1669, 1682 (1975).
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The theory born of this perspective on the defining
characteristic of administrative governance became known as the
"public interest" theory.57 It was characterized by the belief that
"the agency is obligated to exercise its discretion in implementing
statutes with a view to the national interest or general welfare,
rather than yielding to factional pressure at the behest of one or
another powerful interest group."58 As Thomas Merrill notes,
during the post-New Deal period between 1946 and 1966, "the
dominant attitude toward the administrative state continued to be
the public interest conception. This was the mindset of the men in
their thirties and forties who had served in the New Deal, and who
fanned out to fill administrative, academic, and judicial posts in
the 1950's and 1960's."59 These public figures had "faith that
complex problems can be mastered by human reason" and viewed
the administrative agency as "an institution specifically designed
to achieve this ideal."60 The public interest theorists also relied on
what Merrill calls "a theory of comparative institutional
advantage[,]" which involved their belief that "administrative
agencies are more likely to achieve the objective of bringing
complex phenomena under the control of human reason than"
other institutions like the courts, legislatures, and markets.61
Public interest theorists relied less on "the existence of a
public or general interest, apart from the aggregation of particular
interests" and focused instead on producing mechanisms through
which "each interest should be weighed accurately (based on
numbers and intensity) in the political balance." 62 In other words,
57. For representative examples of the theory as articulated in the period,
see Schubert, supra note 53, at 348. See also Thomas H. Malone, Meaning of
the Term 'Public Interest" in the Federal Trade Commission Act, 17 VA. L.
REV. 676, 677 (1931) ("When may a 'proceeding' concerning unfair trade
practices be deemed 'to the interest of the public'? This is the question to be
discussed, and simple as it may seem, the courts and the Commission itself
have found it otherwise.").
58. Jody Freeman, The Private Role in Public Governance, 75 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 543, 558 (2000). See also Michelman, supra note 54, at 148-49.
59. Merrill, supra note 22, at 1048.
60. Id. at 1049 (emphasis added).
61. Id. See also Freeman, supra note 58, at 558 ("As centralized, expert
bodies with combined legislative, executive and adjudicative authority,
theoretically insulated from politics, agencies represented the great hope that
the systematic application of knowledge might lay social and economic ills to
rest."); Shaviro, supra note 41, at 31-32 ("Market economists since Adam
Smith have recognized that government could play a wealth-enhancing role in
the economy by responding to instances of market failure .. . . Later
economists discussed using government to correct externalities[,] or costs and
benefits associated with consumption or production that are not reflected in
market prices.").
62. Shaviro states:
With [a] group's power generally proportionate to [the] size and intensity
of interest, legislative outcomes tend to aggregate accurately the
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the public interest theorists sought not to define the public
interest so much as to create and protect structures which allowed
an organically defined version of the public interest to percolate
naturally to the top of the policy-formation process.63
Critics of the theory64 soon suggested that it was based less on
empirical observation of the growing administrative state than on
the beliefs of many of the New Deal architects about its
possibilities.65 Much like Darwin's application of the scientific
method to challenge the conclusions of "Creationist" theology,
beginning in the mid-1950s, scholars applied a different kind of
empirical analysis, to support a contrary view of the nature of
administrative policy making.66
underlying interests of all individuals and those of society. Moreover,
since everyone's interests are heard and weighed, decisions that were not
abstractly correct in advance may be legitimated ex post by universal,
process-based consent.
Shaviro, supra note 41, at 34-35.
63. See Michael Mont Harmon, Administrative Policy Formulation and the
Public Interest, 29 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 483, 485 (1969) ("[T]he public interest is
the continually changing outcome of political activity among individuals and
groups within a democratic political system.") (emphasis omitted); Sorauf,
supra note 53, at 623 ("[The process of compromise and accommodation, so
characteristic of democratic politics, becomes the enunciator of the public
interest."); A. J. Boudreau, Public Administration and the Public Interest, 16
CAN. J. ECON. & POL. ScI. 371, 373 (1950) ("It becomes, therefore, apparent
that methods have to be devised in order to obtain a deeper and more
thorough comprehension of the public interest. I shall mention three of these
methods, namely: public advisory committees, mass consultation[,] and
publicity and education.").
64. See, e.g., John T. Delacourt & Todd J. Zywicki, The FTC and State
Action: Evolving Views on the Proper Role of Government, 72 ANTITRUST L.J.
1075, 1079-80 (2005) ("Although public interest theory survives in a variety of
forms,.. . skepticism regarding the role of government has grown increasingly
common and now plays a more dominant role in economic and political theory.
While initial challenges to public interest theory emerged much earlier, a
consensus counterpoint began to take hold during the 1960's.").
65. See Leonard J. Arrington, Western Agriculture and the New Deal, 44
AGRIC. HIST. 337, 337 (1970) (analysizing whether "the New Deal attempted,
or achieved, a measure of equal treatment for residents of the various states"
based upon the level of need in those states). See also Anderson & Tollison,
supra note 51, at 175 (finding that "while spending allocations were correlated
with indicators of the relative geographic severity of the Depression, indicators
of relative political influence also seem to be strongly related to spending
patterns. New Deal spending went partly to the needy and partly to those with
political clout."). See generally Vincent Ostrom, Public Choice Theory: A New
Approach to Institutional Economics, 57 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 844, 844 (1975)
(discussing of how economics influenced public choice theorists).
66. See Shaviro, supra note 41, at 42 (discussing skepticism of the public
interest view of legislation).
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B. Public Choice Theory
Just a few decades after the height of its influence and
dominance in the judicial and academic arena, the faith-based
public interest theory was challenged by a new generation of
administrative scholars.67 This new perspective on the
administrative state began with an observation about the stages in
the development of a single agency, and the mechanisms that lead
that agency, over time, to succumb to the influence of the very
entities it has been charged to regulate and control.68 This
observation, Marver Bernstein's 1955 articulation of "agency
capture," led, in the decades to come, to a broader concept of the
role of private influence over public policy-making in all
democratic structures, both within and beyond federal regulatory
agencies.69 This concept became known as the "public choice"
67. For a discussion of the early development of public choice theory, see
John T. Delacourt & Todd J. Zywicki, The FTC and State Action: Evolving
Views on the Proper Role of Government, 72 ANTITRUST L.J. 1075, 1081 (2005)
("Unlike public interest theory, which traces its roots back to republican
theory of government, public choice theory finds its origins in the slightly more
cynical 'pluralist' theory of government."). See also Todd R. Overman, Shame
on You: Campaign Finance Reform Through Social Norms, 55 VAND. L. REV.
1243, 1247-51 (2002).
68. See JOHN H. KNOTT & GARY J. MILLER, REFORMING BUREAUCRACY: THE
POLITICS OF INSTITUTIONAL CHOICE 79 (Prentice Hall 1987) (discussing of the
growth of the administrative state and the essential accompanying growth of a
class of regulatory bureaucracy and the impact of interest-group demands on
this development).
69. See, e.g., Michael Selmi, Is Something Better than Nothing? Critical
Reflections on Ten Years of the FMLA, 15 WASH. U. J. L. & POL'Y 65, 77 (2004)
("The public choice theory, which has been particularly influential in law over
the last two decades (although its influence now seems in decline),
concentrates on the influence of small but well-organized interest groups and
treats legislators as primarily interested in re-election."); Peter Chang,
Country of Origin Labeling: History and Public Choice Theory, 64 FOOD &
DRUG L.J. 693, 693-94 (2009) (arguing that the reemergence of country of
origin labeling requirements is to be explained by public choice theory); Josh
Benson, Comment, The Guantanamo Game: A Public Choice Perspective on
Judicial Review in Wartime, 97 CAL. L. REV. 1219, 1247-59 (2009) (using an
offshoot of the public choice theory to explain the actions of Congress, the
President, and the federal courts when developing detention policy); Miron
Mushkat & Roda Mushkat, The Political Economy of Sovereignty Revisited: A
Re-Examination of the Public Choice Model in Light of China's Accession to the
World Trade Organization, 7 ASPER REV. INT'L BUS. & TRADE 115, 119 (2007)
(analyzing China's accession to the WTO under the public choice theory); John
Setear, Treaties, Custom, Iteration, and Public Choice, 5 CHI. J. INT'L L. 715,
722-24 (2005) (applying the public choice theory to Presidential decision
making within the context of international relations); Eric J. Gouvin, Banking
in North America: The Triumph of Public Choice, 32 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 3-4
(1998) (arguing that public choice theory best explains recent liberalization in
cross-border banking in North America); Geoffrey P. Miller, Public Choice at
the Dawn of the Special Interest State: The Story of Butter and Margarine, 77
CALIF. L. REV. 84-85 (1989) (applying the public choice theory to federal
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theory of administrative governance and remains the dominant
(albeit controversial70) theory of the development and function of
the American administrative state.71
In his 1955 work, "Regulating Business by Independent
Commission," Bernstein observed a natural "life-cycle" of
administrative agencies.72 He noted that while the early stages of
development of agencies are characterized by the kind of "vigorous
and independent regulation" that had been "imagined by the
public interest literature,"73 as time passes and agencies reach a
"period of maturity," they tend to lose broad political support, and
consequently, the ability "to extend regulation beyond the limits
acceptable to the regulated groups" under their jurisdiction.74
Bernstein argued that an agency will invariably fall into a status
that he referred to as "senescence" in which it "becomes closely
identified with and dependent upon the industry it is charged with
regulating,"75 and that during this stage the regulatory entity
functions less as a "policeman and more [as] a manager of the
industry."76 He observed that the phenomenon results in agencies
being transformed into "a friendly protector of private interest
rather than an aggressive agent of the public welfare," providing
supposedly "regulated groups with privileged access to
government."77
Adding to Bernstein's insights, "Mancur Olsen observed that
some small groups impose an undue influence on government
regulations affecting the butter and margarine industries).
70. For critiques of public choice theory, see various articles in the 2002
Cornell Law Review Symposium entitled Symposium Getting Beyond
Cynicism: New Theories of the Regulatory State, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 267
(2002). See also Andrew P. Morriss, Bruce Yandle & Andrew Dorchak,
Choosing How to Regulate, 29 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 179, 220 (2005) (noting
that "capture theory explains a great deal more of regulatory history than does
the public interest theory alone. But there are key elements of the political
struggle that the theory does not explain. It does not predict which of several
competing interest groups caught in a political struggle will capture and which
will lose out. Why, for example, did the eastern coal producers win and the
western coal producers lose in 1977? . .. Capture theory thus represents a first
step toward incorporating interest group politics into regulatory theory but it
is inadequate as an explanation of regulator behavior.").
71. KNOTIT & MILLER, supra note 68.
72. See generally MARVER BERNSTEIN, REGULATING BUSINESS BY
INDEPENDENT COMMISSION (Princeton Univ. Press 1955) (noting that there is
a general pattern of evolution and common experience for an independent
commission).
73. Id. at 79-84.
74. Id. at 86-90.
75. Merrill, supra note 22, at 1060.
76. BERNSTEIN, supra note 72, at 87.
77. Id. at 266. See also KNOTT & MILLER, supra note 68, at 79-80 (noting
that regulators were not only inclined to succumb to interest group pressure,
but also to help generate such pressure when it served their needs).
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decision making because of their enhanced interest in the specific
consequences of regulatory decisions and ability to more effectively
mobilize resources, including information, in support of their
policy objectives than the public at large."78 This dynamic served
to distract agencies from a focus on achieving some semblance of
the broad public interest,79 producing, instead, "systematic
deviations from socially efficient outcomes."80 Other critics of the
period, from both the political lefts' and right,82 bemoaned the
78. See generally MANCUR OLSEN, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION:
PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (Harvard Univ. Press 1965)
(explaining how collective groups can have a stronger influence on the
government than larger groups).
79. Id. at 48. See also Nina A. Mendelson, Regulatory Beneficiaries and
Informal Agency Policymaking, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 397, 431-32 (2007)
(stating that the EPA frequently relies on small organizations when issuing a
change in nonbinding policy guidance).
80. David Strauss, First Amendment Entitlements and Government
Motives: A Reply to Professor Merrill, 93 Nw. U. L. REV. 1205, 1209 (1999).
81. See generally Theodore J. Lowi, Interest Groups and the Consent to
Govern: Getting the People out, for What?, 413 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc.
SCI. 86, 87 (1974) (stating that "[t]he connection between interests and consent
is entirely theoretical and problematic. Furthermore, unless that connection is
more carefully examined than it has been in the recent past, untested
assumptions about the connection produce nothing but mythology."); Theodore
J. Lowi, Four Systems of Policy, Politics, and Choice, 32 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 298
(1972); See generally THEODORE J. Lowi, THE END OF LIBERALISM: THE
SECOND REPUBLIC OF THE UNITED STATES (W. W. Norton & Co. 1969) (noting
the immense growth of the liberal state that allowed interest groups to tighten
their grip on the government); See also Theodore Lowi, The Public Philosophy:
Interest-Group Liberalism, 61 AM. POL. SCl. REV. 5, 8 (1967) (stating that
"[a]nalysis of the real or potential impact of public policies shows how
incomplete is the fit between the earlier public philosophy and the policies it is
supposed to support and justify. It shows that those who espouse social change
in the abstract, especially government-engineered social change, are seldom
peddling policies that would clearly effect any such change."); Theodore J.
Lowi, Review: American Business, Public Policy, Case-Studies, and Political
Theory, 16 WORLD POL. 677 (1964); GABRIEL KOLKO, THE TRIUMPH OF
CONSERVATISM: A REINTERPRETATION OF AMERICAN HISTORY, 1900-1916 (The
Free Press 1963); KOLKO, supra note 24.
82. MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM (The Univ. of Chicago
Press 1962); see generally George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic
Regulation, 2 J. ECON. & MGMT Sol. 3, 3 (1971) (stating "[wlith its power to
prohibit or compel, to take or give money, the state can and does selectively
help or hurt a vast number of industries."); see also Sam Peltzman, Toward a
More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J.L. & ECON. 211, 214 (1976)
(expanding upon Stigler's theory); see generally William C. Mitchell, Chicago
Political Economy: A Public Choice Perspective, 63 PUB. CHOICE 283, 283
(1989) (summarizing the Chicago School of Economics' "approach[] to politics");
Robert D. Tollison, Chicago Political Economy, 63 PUB. CHOICE 293, 293
(1989) (stating that the "[Chicago Political Economy] is a body of literature
which analyzes government from the perspective of price theory and positive
economics . . . . In CPE the state is a mechanism which is used by rational
economic agents to redistribute wealth. Wealth transfers are the essence of
regulatory and governmental behavior in this approach.").
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hyper-influence of private "interest groups," which produced the
various problems of undermining "genuine democracy,"
"restrict[ing] entry and thus confer[ing] monopoly profits on
industry incumbents," and "allowing wealthy capitalist robber
barons to bilk small farmers and business."88
Taken together, the capture theorists shattered the image of
administrative regulation optimistically depicted by the public
interest theorists. They observed that as a result of the hyper-
influence of relatively small groups with identifiably specific
interests, government agencies will rarely, if ever, set out to
promote the "public interest," let alone succeed in doing so. 84
The fact that private, regulated entities would seek to control
the mechanisms for the development of government policy never
appeared particularly remarkable to the early capture theorists.
What surprised and concerned them more was the success that the
regulated entities had in promoting their private interests in the
form of favorable agency policy making.85 Scholars observed that
in the overwhelming majority of specific instances of regulatory
83. For an informative summary of the various political perspectives on the
development of private control over government regulation during the early
public interest period, see Merrill, supra note 22, at 1059-67; see also John
Shepard Wiley, Jr., A Capture Theory of Antitrust Federalism, 99 HARV. L.
REV. 713, 724 (1986) (discussing the remarkably similar conception of capture
theory expressed by Kolko and conservative economist Milton Friedman).
84. See Merrill, supra note 22, at 1043 (stating "[a] key instrumentality of
activist government-the administrative agency-came to be regarded as
suffering from pathologies not shared by other governmental institutions such
as legislatures or courts. The principal pathology emphasized during these
years was 'capture,' meaning that agencies were regarded as being uniquely
susceptible to domination by the industry they were charged with
regulating."); see also Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for
the Bureaucratic State, 105 HARv. L. REV. 1511, 1565-70 (1992) (noting that
"[a]ccording to the capture hypothesis, instead of providing meaningful input
into deliberation about the public interest, industry representatives co-opt
government regulatory power in order to satisfy their private desires.
Regulated entities are well organized and generally well funded, and they
often have strong interests at stake, which they do not share with the polity as
a whole.").
85. See Fred S. McChesney, Purchasing Political Inaction: How Regulators
Use the Threat of Legal "Reform" to Extort Payoffs, 21 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y
211, 213-14 (1977) (arguing both that special interest groups provide resources
to policy makers to realize favorable policy and that policy makers, in turn,
demand resources from special interest groups in return for not regulating
those groups). "[Pirivate persons and firms are being shaken down and forced
to pay protection money to politicians." Id. at 214. This explains, for example,
why banks had an interest in lobbying Congress to prohibit lending at certain
times to congressional candidates. Id. See also Miller, supra note 69 (analyzing
how the American dairy industry organized itself to fight the margarine
industry through rent-seeking behavior in Congress); Gouvin, supra note 69
(applying the public choice theory to explain the removal of restrictions
inhibiting cross-border banking in North America).
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decision making, agencies will be ill-equipped to withstand the
pressure that private interests will be capable of bringing to bear,
often in the form of the presentation of overwhelming amounts of
data and information, during agency "informal" rulemaking
procedures. 86 The limited financial and political resources that
agencies commanded in the context of increasingly restricted
federal entitlement budgets, forced them to "rely on the regulated
industries themselves to furnish the information upon which the
regulators based their decisions."87 As Richard Stewart observed,
given limited financial resources, agencies often depended upon
"outside sources of information, policy development, and political
support."8 8 These sources were primarily the regulated entities
that had "a substantial stake in the substance of agency policy and
the resources to provide such input" and also had a much stronger
"personal stake in agency policy [than] ... an individual member
of an unorganized interest, such as a consumer, [for whom that
interest] is normally too small to justify such representation."89
It was the combination of the hyper-interest that the private
entities have in the results of the policy making process and their
enhanced ability to advocate on behalf of their interests within the
structures of our administrative process which convinced these
scholars (and many judges9O) of both the reality and prevalence of
86. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)-(c) (2006) (requiring agencies to give formal notice
of proposed rules, grant "interested persons an opportunity to participate in
the rule making through submissions of written data, views, or arguments ...
," and mandating that agencies respond to these arguments and concerns in a
"general statement of [the rules'] basis and purpose.").
87. Dion Case, Agency Capture: The USDA's Struggle to Pass Food Safety
Regulations, 7 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 142, 142 (1998).
Of particular importance to public choice theory is the existence of
information and transactions costs and collective action (free-rider)
problems that affect the likelihood that persons with common interests
will establish and maintain an organized entity to promote their
interests. Because persons are expected to be better informed about
matters affecting their most immediate interests than about more
general or public interests, public choice theory predicts that narrow or
special interests will be better represented by organized interest groups
than more general and public interests. Moreover, since the costs to
establish and maintain an organized group and the incidence of free-
riders are likely to increase as the number of potential members
increases, public choice theory also predicts that relatively small
numbers of persons with common interests are more likely to be
represented by organized interest groups than large numbers of persons
with common interests.
David G. Duff, The Abolition of Wealth Transfer Taxes: Lessons from Canada,
Australia and New Zealand, 3 PITT. TAX REV. 71, 80 (2005).
88. Stewart, supra note 56, at 1686.
89. Id.
90. See USA Group Loan Services, Inc. v. Riley, 82 F.3d 708, 714 (7th Cir.
1996) (criticizing an agency promise to promulgate as regulations any
agreement reached by the regulated as "an abdication of regulatory authority
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the agency capture dynamic.9'
Subsequent authors took the logic of institutional, private
hyper-influence and expanded its scope into what came to be
known as "public choice"92 or "interest group"9 3 theory. In the last
quarter of the twentieth century, the focus turned from identifying
the stages at which agency capture could be expected to occur, or
to determining which agencies were more or less susceptible to the
phenomenon, to understanding private-interest control of policy
formation "as something more akin to the universal condition of
the administrative state."94 Professor Stewart observed that by
1975, capture theory had dispelled the earlier "public interest"
faith in the administrative state, noting that "to the extent that
the belief in any objective 'public interest' remains, the agencies
are accused of subverting it in favor of the private interests of
regulated entities."95
While Merrill did not extend his capture analysis to
legislatures and courts,"96 more recent scholars have challenged
the notion that the administrative agency is particularly prone to
the "capture" dynamic, and that other entities in our government
are free of the pathological influence of organized private entities.
Professor Jody Freeman notes that public choice theory "shares
with interest representation a political model of interest group
pressure on agencies, but it goes still further, treating agency
outcomes as products of interest group appeals to individual
bureaucrats' preferences [extending] the pathology of capture,
moreover, to legislatures."97 Others have addressed the limits of
to the regulated, the full burgeoning of the interest-group state, and the final
confirmation of the 'capture' theory of administrative regulation.").
91. See supra notes 67-81 and accompanying text; see also Ostrom &
Ostrom, supra note 54, at 204-12 (summarizing the development of the public
choice theory and its core intellectual pillars).
92. See Dongsheng Zang, Divided by Common Language: 'Capture' Theories
in GATT/WTO and the Communicative Impasse, 32 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP.
L. REV. 423, 433 (2009) (explaining that "public choice" theory was developed
in the 1950s and 1960s by a "group of economists interested in applying Ordo-
liberal doctrines to the study of political processes, such as public finance,
voting, and lawmaking.").
93. See Michael Rosensaft, The Role of Purposivism in the Delegation of
Rulemaking Power to the Courts, 29 VT. L. REV. 611, 631-32 (2005) (stating
that "interest group theory advocates that "rational" legislators responding to
rational interest groups will not, in fact, produce purposive statutes.").
94. Merrill, supra note 22, at 1060.
95. Stewart, supra note 56, at 1682. Stewart noted that it was, by then,
"widely accepted ... that the cooperative overrepresentation of regulated . ..
interest[s] in the process of agency decision results in a persistent policy bias
in favor of these interests." Id. at 1713.
96. Merrill, supra note 22, at 1063.
97. See Freeman, supra note 58, at 561 (noting "[]ike legislators motivated
by desire for re-election, bureaucrats rationally pursue their own interests
when exercising administrative discretion. The Theory treats administrative
[44:353372
Punctuated Equilibrium
the public choice theory in providing a convincing explanation for
the empirical dynamics of the administrative state.98 Additional
related approaches, like civic republicanism and neo-pluralist
theory, have provided additional insights into the nature of
governmental rulemaking, filling some of the broad gap between
public interest and public choice perspectives. 99 But the essential
insight of the public choice approach, the acknowledgment of the
dominant role of private interests in governmental policy making
at the expense of a focus on a more broadly defined public interest,
remains the foundation for assessment of the potential for
administrative evolution.
III. PUNCTUATED EQUILIBRIUM: EVOLUTION IN THE
ADMINISTRATIVE STATE
A. The Mechanism for Change in the Public Choice Model
One question left largely unanswered by the public choice
analysis 00 is why, given the stifling control that private interests
procedures, moreover, as a set of controls imposed on agencies by legislators
seeking to facilitate interest group monitoring of agencies."). Professor
Freeman goes on to offer a critique of public choice theory, noting that it fails
to provide a satisfactory description of the interactions and relationships
between public and private actors. Id. at 547-48.
98. See Croley, supra note 37, at 10 (explaining that Professor Croley seeks
to determine whether "patterns of participation in administrative decision-
making processes [are] especially consonant or dissonant with the
expectations of any theory" noting, in regard to public choice theory that
agency processes seem unlikely "mechanisms for facilitating the delivery of
regulatory rents.").
99. For a discussion and comparison of public interest, public choice, civic
republican and neopluralist theories of government decision making, see
Freeman, supra note 58, at 559-60. Ultimately, however, Freeman dismisses
each of these theories and advances her own theory, which emphasizes the
complex network of relationships and "interdependence" between public and
private actors. Id. at 564-65. See also Croley, supra note 37, at 56-86
(discussing these theories of governmental decision making).
100. Spence and Cross note that public choice theorists have not provided
much analysis into why legislatures create agencies. David B. Spence & Frank
Cross, A Public Choice Case for the Administrative State, 89 GEO. L.J. 97, 104
(2000). Rather, these theorists have focused on the "politician-agency
relationship, without making any explicit argument that particular kinds of
power arrangements are desirable or undesirable in any sense." Id. Some have
characterized agencies themselves as rent-seeking interests. Id. at 99, 104.
Agency officials, rather than striving to serve a public interest, seek instead to
"pad [their] own pockets" by maximizing their budgetary resources. Id. at 104-
05 n.36 (citing THE BUDGET MAXIMIZING BUREAUCRAT: APPRAISALS AND
EVIDENCE (Andre Blais & Stephane Dion eds., Univ. of Pittsburgh Press 1991)
and WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, JR., BUREAUCRACY AND REPRESENTATIVE
GOVERNMENT (Transaction Publishers 1971)). Following the logic of public
choice theorists, however, legislatures create agencies because rent-seeking
interests desire the creation of agencies in order to regulate price or restrict
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impose on governmental policy making, the creation of new
regulatory demands on industries and other regulated entities
could be expected to occur. The public choice model does not
appear to leave much room for the possibility of significant or
dramatic administrative evolution in the form of new policy
requirements or new administrative entities.' 0 ' If the public choice
theorists are right, and the broad public interest, however it might
be defined in a given instance, has little, if any, chance of
influencing agency decisions in the wake of the inherent private
interest power and resource advantage, then one would expect
very little in the way of genuinely innovative policy production.
What incentive would entrenched private interests have in
upsetting the regulatory status quo that provides the context for
their ascendant status? If the entities that control policy formation
are truly dominant, and achieved their dominance within a
relevant regulatory landscape, it is difficult to imagine the
motivations that might lead these entities to change this
landscape-absent the need to undermine the vitality of new
competitors who threaten their domination. But even if they were
perceived as necessary to ensure the continued primacy of the
regulated entities, any changes that could be expected to occur in
the nature of regulation would involve no new burdens on the
dominant private interests or a concomitant increase in benefits to
a broadly defined public interest.102 In other words, the public
the entry of competitors into the market. Peltzman, supra note 82, at 214.
Under Stigler's model, "[t]here is essentially a political auction in which the
high bidder receives the right to tax the wealth of everyone else . Id. at
212.
101. See Repetto, supra note 13, at 3 (explaining that "[w]hen
environmentalists pushed for stronger action, industrial interests pushed
back; when industry demanded regulatory relief, environmentalists and their
allies resisted. The result has been a sort of rough equilibrium, with little
sustained movement in any direction . . . . The same pattern of prolonged
stalemate interrupted once in a great while by abrupt bursts of policy
innovation has been seen in the history of particular environmental and
resource issues.").
102. See KNOTT & MILLER, supra note 68 (arguing that legislators promote
administrative agencies because it advances the goals of interest groups and
advances the legislators' reelection goals). Knott & Miller attribute
Congressional support for civil service reform during the early twentieth
century to a desire on the part of Congress to "provide efficient, particularized
services to the emerging organized interest groups." Id. at 78. Bureaucracies,
in turn, cultivate relationships with interest groups and legislators by
promoting the interest-group demands as a means to maximize their resources
and status. Id. at 79-80. Knott and Miller further argue that a similar
rationale caused Congress to create independent agencies. Id. at 82. Congress
established the FTC, for example, at the height of power for two different
interest groups: major corporations and those who favored antitrust
regulation. Id. Rather than create an executive agency with specific objectives
and procedures-and lose reelection in an ensuing crossfire between various
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choice model would appear to allow for only two versions of
administrative evolution: no significant change at all or only those
changes that enhance the private interest of the dominant
regulated entities at the expense of new competitors or the public
at large. 103 But, much like Darwin's gradualism thesis, this
conception of the nature of the administrative law over time is not
borne out by political science's version of the "fossil record." The
federal administrative regime has experienced waves of innovative
and expansive change, in various eras, and in various forms, for a
wide range of reasons. 104 From the ICC and the other early
independent federal agencies, to the revolutionary expansion of
regulatory requirements during the New Deal era,105 to the
increasing development of entitlement based "welfare-state"
interest groups-Congress created the FTC and gave it ambiguous powers and
standards. Id. This "g[olt individual members of Congress off the hook." Id.
103. See, e.g., Jon Simon Stefanuca, The Fall of the Federal Election
Campaign Act of 1971: A Public Choice Explanation, 19 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB.
POL'Y 237, 269-70 (2008) (arguing that campaign finance regulation, including
the McCain-Feingold reforms, constitute the imposition of a "cartel"); Burton
A. Abrams, Campaign-Finance Reform: A Public Choice Perspective, 120 PUB.
CHOICE 379, 395-96 (2004) (concluding, upon an analysis of the Bipartisan
Campaign Reform Act, that the legislation serves "special interests" rather
than the "public interest); F.G. Scrimgeour & E.C. Pasour, Jr., A Public Choice
Perspective on Agricultural Policy Reform: Implications of the New Zealand
Experience, 78 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 257, 263 (1996) (arguing that the New
Zealand business community supported the country's deregulatory reforms,
despite the business community's prior support of the regulatory regime,
"because it found market activity more profitable than rent seeking");
Jonathan R. Macey, Administrative Agency Obsolescence and Interest Group
Formation: A Case Study of the SEC at Sixty, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 909, 914
(1994) (noting that "[a]n agency that has been rendered obsolete by exogenous
changes in the form of technological development or new marketplace
developments will find that it must provide favors to discrete constituencies in
order to preserve some measure of support for its continued existence.");
Robert D. Tollison, Public Choice and Legislation, 74 VA. L. REV. 339, 346
(1988) (stating that "[1]egislators serve for more than one term; hence, as
members of subsequent legislatures, they can keep legislative benefits flowing
to their interest groups so the legislature itself can promote the durability of
legislation and long-term contracts with interest groups."); L. L. Wade,
Administration, Public Choice and the Pathos of Reform, 41 REV. POL. 350,
351 (1979) (providing that "[R]eform itself is costly, and in two ways: (1)
bureaucrats will evaluate and support, undermine, or nullify reform proposals
on the basis of what the new rules imply for their interests . . . (2) The
movement from the status quo to a new system is itself costly for many
societal interests."). But see Will Martin, Public Choice Theory and Australian
Agricultural Policy Reform, 34 AUSTRALIAN J. AGRIC. ECON. 189, 197-209
(1979) (reviewing agricultural policy reforms and finding that the public choice
model fails to fully account for the successful enactment of several of the
reforms).
104. Rabin, supra note 21, at 1189.
105. See supra notes 38 and 46 and accompanying text.
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reforms,106 to national regulations affecting the workplace and the
environment,107 the administrative regime evinces significant
developmental variety at the macro level. Much of this change
appears to belie the central public choice thesis, in that it is
intended to serve some notion of the public good at the expense of
the private interests of the dominant regulated entities.108
So how can this powerful and compelling theoretical
framework be reconciled with the reality that does not seem, at
first glance, to flow directly from its precepts? The answer offered
here is that accepting the notion that, all other things being equal,
the inherent advantages of special interests will overwhelm any
expression of broad public interest perspectives, but this
dominance can be undermined, at least periodically, in isolated
instances. Specifically, the otherwise diffuse and insufficiently
compelling broad interest in promoting salutary government
action that is invariably drowned out by the more fervent
expression of private concerns, is at certain times enhanced to
such an extent that the normal dynamics of agency or legislative
capture are neutralized. It is the instance of dramatic public
events that has focused exceptional public attention and interest
106. See generally John Myles & Jill Quadagno, 76 Soc. ScI. REV. 34 (2002)
(discussing the development of government entitlement programs); see also
Paul Craig Roberts, A Reconsideration of the Welfare State, 142 PROC. AM.
PHIL. Soc. 396, 396-98 (1998) (attacking the welfare state as fiscally
unsustainable); see also Note, Developing Welfare Programs to the States: A
Public Choice Perspective, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1984, 2001 (1996) (arguing that
devolving welfare programs to the states will exacerbate "the race to the
bottom"); see also Carl A. Auerbach, Is Government the Problem or the
Solution?, 33 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 495, 514 (1996) (highlighting major elements
of the welfare state and arguing for their importance in "establishling] justice,
promot[ing] the general welfare, and ensur[ing] domestic tranquility").
107. See generally Daniel Riesel & Dan Chorost, When Regulatory Universes
Collide: Environmental Regulation in the Workplace, 13 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J.
613 (2005); Randy S. Rabinowitz & Mark M. Hager, Designing Health and
Safety: Workplace Hazard Regulation in the United States and Canada, 33
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 373, 375-96 (2000); Wayne B. Gray & John T. Scholz, Does
Regulatory Enforcement Work? A Panel Analysis of OSHA Enforcement, 27 L.
& Soc. REV. 177 (1993) (reviewing the pillars of the federal workplace health
and safety regime under the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970).
108. As observed in the area of environmental regulation, for example,
"across the entire range of federal environmental policy decision, as in other
policy domains, patterns of budgetary change follow a similar pattern of
incrementalism broken very infrequently by abrupt changes. The norm is
stability from year to year. The infrequent exception is major change."
Repetto, supra note 16, at 4. Further, "stable institutional structures, shared
understandings of policy goals and available technologies, and a balance of
power among interests ensure no dramatic shifts from the status quo . ...
While the punctuations may come only rarely, they can have long-lasting
consequences." Baumgartner, supra note 16, at 24-25. Baumgartner loosely
attributes punctuated changes to "momentum" of "social cascades" and the
"simultaneous observ[ation]" of a "signaling event." Id. at 37-38.
376 [ 44:353
Punctuated Equilibrium
in a particular area that have provided the rare enhanced efficacy
of the "public interest" as a policy-making objective and the
concurrent quantum shift in the regulatory landscape. This
administrative version of "punctuated equilibrium" provides a
model for understanding the limited, but significant dynamic of
administrative evolution.
There are three ways in which dramatic public events alter
the normal equilibrium of private interest influence over policy
making to facilitate significant, public-focused regulatory change.
First, events that result not only in some kind of serious injury or
harm, but suggest a serious risk of similar harm for a broad cross-
section of the population in an area where the risk either had not
already been identified or was not taken particularly seriously,
serve to focus and magnify broad public concern to a sufficient
level to make the otherwise diffuse and weak public interest
robust enough to counter private interests that would otherwise
resist an alteration in the status quo.
Second, when the existing legal or regulatory framework is
insufficient to provide a satisfactory response to a risk that is
exposed by the dramatic event, or when the regulatory structure
itself is seen as one of the root causes of the event, the newly
enhanced focus and attention produces an imperative not just to
"do something," but specifically, to alter the existing regulatory
structure, either enhancing it substantially or replacing it. It is the
dramatic public events that meet both of these criteria-that
expose substantial risks of future harm, and that seem impervious
to existing structural remedies-that are the "unresolvable
regulatory moments" that parallel Gould and Eldredge's
"geological" ones and that form the foundation for much of the
measurable evolution of administrative entities and authority.
Third, dramatic public events can serve to alter political
balance within a particular policy arena to the benefit of what had
been, up to that time, the consistently "losing" side.109 While they
are unlikely, on their own, to produce a politically effective
movement to counter the dominance of regulated entities over
their regulators and their policy innovation, some dramatic events
109. As Repetto notes in regard to dynamic equilibria in the area of
environmental policy:
Advocacy groups often try to bring new information to bear on policy
issues, but with mixed results. Technological changes can be diverted to
serve other non-environmental objectives, as has happened with
automobile manufacturing in recent decades. A new president may find
it impossible to challenge some entrenched interests successfully. ...
Nonetheless, disturbances brought about by such exogenous factors may
represent moments of opportunity when other interventions might have
an enhanced probability of bringing about significant change because
the policy systems has been driven to a critical point.
Repetto, supra note 13, at 12.
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and the political fallout and dominant public narrative they
produce can serve to bolster existing, somewhat nascent, or at
least unsuccessful, political structures and bring new power and
potential for success.
The power of these events to provide the conditions where
otherwise static political dynamics can be altered is enhanced by
the dominant popular narrative(s) with which they are invariably
associated. Indeed, it is often the way that the story of the event is
told to, and understood by, the relevant portion of the polity, much
more than the specific facts concerning the event itself, that gives
rise to the conditions that make significant administrative
evolution possible. Many factors play a role in the development of
this dominant narrative including media coverage, propaganda,
and the power and products of investigatory commissions, which
are invariably offered as the first level government response to
disasters.110 These commissions have demonstrated an exceptional
capacity to focus and extend what is often brief public attention
even to the most alarming of dramatic events, and to come up with
specific and politically viable policy proposals.11'
The events chosen for analysis are not intended to constitute
a complete list of dramatic public events that served to impact the
nature and pace of administrative evolution in the United States,
or even in the twentieth century,112 or to suggest that this is the
only viable model to explain regulatory and policy change over
time.113 Such a broad analysis of all dramatic and impactful events
110. See generally, e.g., Report of the President's Commission on the
Accident at Three Mile Island (1979), http://www.threemileisland.org/
downloads/188.pdf (last visited Apr. 19, 2011); Andrew Cowper Lawson &
Harry Fielding Reid, THE CALIFORNIA EARTHQUAKE OF APRIL 18, 1906:
REPORT OF THE STATE EARTHQUAKE INVESTIGATION COMMISSION (Nabu Press
2010); THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL
COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTAcKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, supra note
32; various reports of the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, http://www.fcic
.gov/reports/ (last visited Apr. 19, 2011) (summarizing examples of
governmental response to disasters).
111. However, not all great tragedies produce great change. Even after the
worst oil spill in U.S. history, significant environmental reform is not
anticipated. "Great tragedy, with the right timing, can bring great change ....
When people are . .. sort of hunkered down over the economy, then that's not
going to produce significant change." David A. Fahrenthold & Juliet Eiplerin,
Historic Oil Spill Fails to Produce Gains for U.S. Environmentalists, WASH.
POST, July 12, 2010, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2
010/07/11/AR2010071103523.html (quoting Kenneth P. Green, American
Enterprise Institute).
112. For example, the Enron and WorldCom scandals led to the passage of
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002. 15 U.S.C. § 7201 (2006).
113. The creation of the Department of Interior in 1849, for example,
occurred decades after policymakers identified the need for the creation of an
agency with oversight over internal affairs: "[the creation of the Department of
Interior] was the direct result of the pressure of administrative burdens. There
378 [44:353
Punctuated Equilibrium
would be impossible in this format, and I do not intend to argue
that there are not various other reasons for changes in
government structure and focus over time. The hope is that the
three examples chosen for discussion will provide characteristic
examples of the ways that publicly experienced disasters, along
with other factors, can result in dramatic quantum shifts in the
scope and substance of our administrative structures, or not.
B. Two "Unresolvable" Regulatory Moments
1. The Triangle Shirtwaist Factory Fire of 1911
On a late Saturday afternoon in early spring 1911, in the
heart of one of the world's most populace cities, 146 people died in
a fire in a loft factory workshop-the "Triangle" factory-near
Washington Square Park in Manhattan.114 The victims were
garment workers, and like most other garment workers of the era,
were mostly immigrant young women, many in their teens."15
The fire was at once both remarkable and routine. While it
remains the most deadly workplace accident ever to occur in New
York City, 116 incidents of workplace injury and death were far
from rare in the early twentieth century in New York City or
elsewhere in the United States.1 7 But this workplace disaster,
is no evidence to show that general opinion outside administrative or
Congressional circles had anything whatever to do with it. It was certainly not
the outcome of wide-spread demand or popular pressure." Henry Barrett
Learned, The Establishment of the Secretaryship of the Interior, 16 AM. HIST.
REV. 751, 770 (1911). Congress established the Federal Communications
Commission after similar administrative concerns pertaining to radio
transmissions emerged in the 1920s and 1930s. See generally R.H. Coase, The
Federal Communications Commission, 2 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1959) (discussing the
development of government regulation). Finally, no dramatic public events
played a role in the changes to Medicare under the Medicare Modernization
Act in 2003. See generally Thomas R. Oliver et al., A Political History of
Medicare and Prescription Drug Coverage, 82 MILBANK Q. 283 (2004)
(discussing the regulatory and policy changes to Medicare under the Medicare
Modernization Act).
114. See generally LEON STEIN, THE TRIANGLE FIRE, (Cornell Univ. Press
1962); DAVID VON DREHLE, TRIANGLE: THE FIRE THAT CHANGED AMERICA
(Atlantic Monthly Press 2003) (detailing the tragic circumstances surrounding
the Triangle Fire).
115. Id. at 270-83.
116. See id. at 3 (stating that the Triangle Shirtwaist Factory fire was the
worst workplace accident in New York City for ninety years-until September
11).
117. See id. (noting that "death was an almost routine workplace hazard in
those days. By one estimate, one hundred or more Americans died on the job
every day in the booming industrial years around 1911."). Exactly four months
before the Triangle tragedy-on November 25, 1910-fire broke out in an old
four story building at Orange and High Streets in Newark, New Jersey. Id. In
minutes, twenty-five factory workers, most of them young women, were dead.
Id. Of these, six were burned to death, nineteen jumped to death. Id.
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unlike all the horrible ones that had come before,118 served as a
catalyst for a significant evolution of workplace regulation, first in
New York, and then in the rest of the United States. 19
The Triangle fire occurred in the waning years of Tammany
Hall control of New York City government.120 The Democratic
political machine that was only rarely out of power in the fifty
years leading up to the fire based its success, in large measure, on
its ability to identify and defeat evolving political rivals. The most
feared challenge to its authority in 1911 was the Progressive
movement, personified in two important New York politicians,
Governor Charles Evans Hughes and recent past-President Teddy
Roosevelt. "Progressive" elected officials had recently enjoyed some
political success by pushing workplace reforms, 121 many of which
were struck down by the courts in cases like Lochner v. New
Yorkl 22 and similar cases between 1910 and 1925.123 As David Von
Drehle observed in his recent history of the Triangle fire and its
impact, "the machine protected the established order-which was,
after all, quite good to Tammany."124 But as powerful as the
Tammany machine was, it depended on one primary energy
source-votes, and the basis for its ongoing concern about other
political entities or movements was the potential they had to
siphon away significant numbers of their loyal voter base.
The increase in immigration at the time from southern and
118. See U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, INDUS.
ACCIDENTS STATISTICS, BULL. No. 157 (1915) (discussing the frequency of
industrial accident statistics in the United States in the early twentieth
century). Industrial accidents were a common occurrence at the time,
accounting for approximately eighty-three thousand deaths per year in the
United States. Id. at 12. Most of these deaths and injuries resulted from
accidents claiming a few lives each. U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, GOV'T REGULATION
OF WORKERS' SAFETY AND HEALTH 1877-1917: CHAPTER 5, PROGRESSIVE ERA
INVESTIGATIONS, available at http://www.dol.gov/oasam/programs/history/mon
o-regsafepart05.htm.
119. See Friedman & Thompson, supra note 36, at 256-57 (stating that the
fire became a symbol of rampant worker abuse of the time and helped to
"galvanize support" for the labor-reform movement).
120. VON DREHLE, supra note 114, at 21-22.
121. Id. at 21 (discussing the progressive movement and two of its leaders,
Charles Evans Hughes and Theodore Roosevelt).
122. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (holding state law setting
a maximum on the number of hours in a work week violated the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
123. See Jay Burns Baking Co. v. Bryan, 264 U.S. 504 (1924) (holding law
requiring standardized weights for loaves of bread unconstitutional); Adkins v.
Children's Hospital, 261 U.S. 525 (1917) (declaring a law setting minimum
wage for women unconstitutional); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915)
(striking down a Kansas statute prohibiting employers from conditioning
employment on an employee's agreement to refrain from joining a labor
union); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908) (declaring unconstitutional
law requiring employers to hire employees with union membership).
124. VON DREHLE, supra note 114, at 21.
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central Europe provided the basis for an electoral threat to
Tammany power in the form of thousands of potential voters who
worked, among other places, in the garment sweatshops that were
the basis of Manhattan's industrial economy.125 And in the years
leading up to the Triangle disaster, these groups-both recent
immigrants and garment workers-had become increasingly
politically active.126 High-level Tammany officials understood that
their political futures "depended on Tammany's continued hold on
the loyalty of the working-class voters, the backbone of the Hall's
power for more than half a century."127
In November 1909, growing dissatisfaction with working
conditions, wages, and hours in the garment industry produced a
large-scale general strike with at least 20,000 (and perhaps as
many as 40,000128) garment workers walking out of their jobs.129
Almost immediately many of the smaller factories collapsed under
the pressure and agreed to many of the union demands including a
pay increase, a reduced fifty-two-hour work-week, and union-only
factories.o30 But the majority of owners, and all of the large factory
owners-like those of the Triangle Factory-resolved to resist the
strike and do everything in their power, including physical
violence (imposed by both strike breakers and the Tammany-
controlled police), to destroy the union.131 The large factory owners
employed one additional strikebreaking tactic-offering to send all
of the labor disputes, with the exception of the union shop
requirement won in many of the smaller shops, to arbitration. 32
The union's local office rejected the offer immediately, but the
proposal had the (possibly intentional) effect of exacerbating a
125. ROBERT A. SLAYTON, EMPIRE STATESMAN: THE RISE AND REDEMPTION
OF AL SMITH 89 (2001) (discussing New York's role in the women's garment
manufacturing industry).
126. VON DREHLE, supra note 114, at 53.
127. Id. at 189 ("New York's working-class population was growing at a
phenomenal rate. If a way could be found to make the new immigrants as
loyal as earlier generations, then Tammany might one day dictate policy for
the entire Democratic Party and send its own men to the White House."); see
also Daniel Citro, Underworlds and Underdogs: Big Tim Sullivan and
Metropolitan Politics in New York, 1889-1913, 78 J. AM. HIST. 536, 553 (1991)
(analyzing the growing importance of labor and immigrant issues in Tammany
Hall politics through the early years of the twentieth century).
128. VON DREHLE, supra note 114, at 62.
129. ELIZABETH V. BURT, THE PROGRESSIVE ERA: PRIMARY DOCUMENTS ON
EVENTS FROM 1890 TO 1914 206 (Greenwood Press 2004) (describing the
Uprising of Thirty Thousand as lasting from November 1909 to February 1910
and the demands of the strikers-including "adequate fire escapes and
unlocked doors").
130. See id. (stating that some employers made concessions to the strikers,
but 3000 employees returned to work at factories, including the Triangle
Shirtwaist Company, without any changes having been made).
131. VoN DREHLE, supra note 114, at 63.
132. Id. at 80.
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growing fissure between the union leadership and the wealthy
progressive women who had provided personal and financial
support for the strike.133 This support fell off substantially, and
the strike soon collapsed. 134 But the emergence of a potent political
alliance between wealthy progressives and immigrant workers,
albeit short-lived, was of great concern to Tammany officials in
New York and Albany135 and would prove to be more effective and
resilient in the years and decades to come.
It was with the failed uprising of the "30,000" in 1909-1910
as an immediate backdrop that the Triangle fire occurred. In many
ways, the working conditions at the Triangle Shirtwaist Factory,
notwithstanding the passionate and ultimately successful anti-
union stance of its owners, were state of the art, and relative to
many of the other garment factories in New York City, quite safe.
But judged by the standards of fire safety in buildings in other
parts of the country, and in other industries, the Triangle factory
was a severe fire and safety hazard.136 Innovations such as
"firewalls, fire doors, fire stairs, and most of all, automatic
sprinklers, were available, in theory, to Manhattan factory
owners. But it was virtually impossible to find such features
anywhere in the city."137 Before the Triangle fire "reformers had
met with little progress in achieving legislative reform, either at
the city or state level. The City failed to provide adequate safety
laws and did not enforce the few, deficient standards already in
existence."138
The factory was housed in the Asch Building, a loft 3 9 high-
rise near New York University and Washington Square Park.140
133. Id. at 81 (stating that many progressive sympathizers viewed the
radicals' rejection of the arbitration proposal as too extreme).
134. Behrens, supra note 33, at 364-65.
135. At the time, New York State Tammany leader Charles Murphy:
surely realized that an unprecedented alliance for change-centered in
the very heart of Tammany's power, downtown Manhattan-had
shattered as quickly as it had come together. Though the strike
continued through January, it no longer threatened Murphy's world. He
could continue to approach change at his own pace. The uprising once
hailed as another Lexington or Bunker Hill had deteriorated into a
tangle of resentments.
VON DREHLE, supra note 114, at 84.
136. Id. at 160.
137. Id. at 161 (discussing the influence of insurance companies on the lack
of risk reduction in New York City buildings).
138. Behrens, supra note 33, at 365.
139. Friedman & Thompson, supra note 36, at 257 (noting that "[tlhe New
York labor code mandated 250 cubic feet of air per worker; but the company
was able to pack workers in very tightly because the building was a loft with
high ceilings and thus had enough air space to meet the ventilation
requirements.").
140. The loft was an innovation both in architecture and industrial design
that had become overwhelmingly popular during this period. VON DREHLE,
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The Triangle factory was not precisely a "sweatshop"141 but one of
the early "modern" factory floors.142 While an improvement on the
sweatshop model in several respects, including more comfortable
working conditions and more ventilation, the primary drawback of
this innovation was the distance between the workers and the
ground floor. 143 And one drawback for the owners was that the
increased number of workers in the same place facilitated union
organization.144
Max Blank and Isaac Harris, the owners of the Triangle
Company, devised various approaches to deal with the threat
posed by labor organization of their workforce. They brought
contractors into the factory with their own workers to provide a
buffer between high-level management and a portion of the
workforce, and they established a sham in-house "union" that they
hoped would draw the attention of their workers away from the
real thing.145 But Blank and Harris found these tactics
unsuccessful and were forced, in 1909, to lock-out their workers to
make good on a threat to fire anyone who joined a union.146 More
ominously, on other occasions, they were alleged to have
intentionally locked their workers in (and locked potential labor
organizers out) by locking the stairwell doors on the several floors
they occupied in the Asch Building loft. 147
The Triangle Factory occupied the entire eighth, ninth, and
supra note 114, at 47. See also 141 Men and Girls Die in Waist Factory Fire;
Trapped High Up in Washington Place Building; Street Strewn With Bodies;
Piles of Dead Inside, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 26, 1911, reprinted in BURT, supra note
129, at 210-11 (describing the building as "fireproof' and stating that it
showed no external signs of the fire).
141. A sweatshop would be a modified tenement space with primary resident
families and extended families providing the labor. SLAYTON, supra note 125.
142. The new design provided real benefits over the late nineteenth century
fixtures not so much in terms of working conditions, but in the efficiency and
profitability of production. VON DREHLE, supra note 114, at 47.
143. "A decade into the new century, half the workers in Manhattan toiled
on the seventh floor or above-which was at least one floor higher than the
city fire department could easily reach." Id. at 48.
144. Increasingly, the home-based tenement sweatshops, with workers for
the same company spread out across buildings and neighborhoods, were
replaced with the centralized factory, where "scores-even hundreds-of
workers gathered each day in the same place." SLAYTON, supra note 125, at
90.
145. See STEIN, supra note 114, at 163.
146. VON DREHLE, supra note 114, at 49.
147. Notwithstanding the relative modernity of their facilities, Blank and
Harris were two of the more infamous garment factory owners and had been
the subject of various complaints from current and former workers, and even
from law professors at the neighboring NYU law school who had observed and
made formal complaints about overcrowding in the factory. VON DREHLE,
supra note 114, at 135.
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tenth floors of the Asch Building. 148 March 25, 1911, the day of the
fire, was a Saturday, which meant it was the last day of the six-
day work-week of a garment worker. The fire began just before 5
p.m. as the factory was closing and hundreds of people were
gathered in the adjacent Washington Square Park to enjoy the
perfect early spring evening. 49 It apparently started from a
carelessly discarded cigarette in a bin of fabric remnants near a
cutting table.150 The small fire grew to an inferno in a matter of
seconds, fed by the highly flammable cloth, cotton, and tissue
paper at or near the cutting tables, bits of which were soon
floating around the room spreading the fire wherever they
landed.151 The approximately 180 people who had been working on
the eighth floor fled in three separate directions.152 After water
pails proved ineffective, one worker tried the eighth floor water
hose, and then another the ninth floor hose pulled down from
above, but when the valves were opened no water came out.153 A
large group of workers gathered at the Washington Street door,
which was locked until one of the managers arrived with a key and
provided an escape route for scores of the workers.154
Most of the occupants of the tenth floor (approximately
seventy in total), including Harris and Blanck's two young
daughters, escaped through the spreading flames to the roof by
way of the Greene Street stairs only to find no safe access either to
the ground (130 feet down) or to the adjacent buildings, which
were significantly higher than the Asch Building. 55 This group
was eventually saved by Frank Sommer, a law professor at New
York University, and his students, who found two ladders on the
roof of their neighboring building, and used them to lead the
escapees to safety. 56
The workers on the ninth floor (approximately 250 of them,
more than eighty percent of them young women)157 suffered
most.s58 Some escaped to the roof by way of the Greene Street
stairway. 59 The other stairwell door, on the Washington Street
148. Id. at 117-20.
149. STEIN, supra note 114, at 11-14 (discussing the neighborhood around
the factory).
150. World Reporter Finds Indications That Locked Doors Caused Big Loss
of Life in Fire, N.Y. WORLD, Mar. 27, 1911, reprinted in BURT, supra note 129,
at 212-13 (describing the Fire Chief s beliefs as to the origins of the fire).
151. VON DREHLE, supra note 114, at 119.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 121.
154. Id. at 118, 121-23, 126-27, 133.
155. STEIN, supra note 114, at 43-47.
156. Id. at 48-50.
157. VON DREHLE, supra note 114, at 139.
158. STEIN, supra note 114, at 51-66 (describing the fire from the perspective
of those trapped on the ninth floor).
159. Id. at 59-62.
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side, was locked.o60 Within about six minutes of the fire entering
the room, it had blocked the Greene Street stairs leaving the
elevator, fire escape, and the windows as the only exit routes. 161
Some workers escaped through the elevator, although it was soon
forced out of service as the fire blocked the shaft and the bodies of
desperate workers filled its roof.162 The fire escape, soon crowded
with far more people than it was built to hold,163 collapsed almost
immediately, sending scores of workers to their deaths. 6 4 Barely
ten minutes into the fire, the only remaining exit for anyone left in
the loft, most on the ninth floor, was to jump from the windows. 65
The first jumper came down at 4:40 followed by scores of
others. 66 Fire fighters and other onlookers tried their best to catch
jumpers in nets or tarps,167 but the nine-story drop and the
number of people jumping made it impossible to do so. 6 8 The
firefighters had the fire under control on all three floors by 5:15,
but it was decidedly too late.169 In just thirty minutes, 146
Triangle workers, 123 of them women, had died. 70
The spectacle of the Triangle workers, mostly young women,
jumping to their certain deaths from the ninth floor was witnessed
by thousands of stunned New Yorkers.171 The time and location of
the fire combined to ensure a large audience.172 Once word of the
fire got out, thousands were able to travel mere blocks to witness
the vivid tragedy. Frances Perkins, the executive secretary of the
160. VON DREHLE, supra note 114, at 164.
161. Id. at 149.
162. STEIN, supra note 114, at 65-66.
163. VoN DREHLE, supra note 114, at 147.
164. "Some victims smashed through the skylight and into the cellar.
Others were impaled on the spiked iron fence that bisected the bottom of the
shaft. Some came down burning and, when they landed, set off fires in the
Asch Building basement." Id. at 148.
165. Id. at 153.
166. SLAYTON, supra note 125, at 90 (workers were forced to make "the
impossible choice between being burned alive or jumping to their deaths.").
167. Friedman & Thompson, supra note 36, at 258-59. "The fire department
arrived soon after the fire began, but it was of little help to the victims. The
tallest fire ladder reached only to the sixth floor and the limited water
pressure of the time only allowed fire hoses to reach the seventh floor." Id.
168. VON DREHLE, supra note 114, at 156-157.
169. Id. at 165.
170. Id. at 166.
171. Id. at 159.
172. Approximately 2.3 million people lived in Manhattan in 1910, and 4.7
million people lived in New York City. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE
CENSUS, THIRTEENTH CENSUS OF THE UNITED STATES TAKEN IN THE YEAR,
VOL. 3, 188 (1910), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/www/abs/decennial
/1910.htm. In comparison, San Francisco, CA had a population of 417,000.
DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, THIRTEENTH CENSUS OF THE
UNITED STATES TAKEN IN THE YEAR, VOL. 4, 149 (1910), available at http://ww
w.census.gov/prod/www/abs/decennial/1910.htm. Chicago, IL had a population
of 2.2 million. Id. at 436.
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Consumers League, and by 1911 a veteran advocate for workplace
safety,173 was one of these neighboring witnesses.174 She would
become a central figure in the post-fire drive for reform, 75 and
later, the Secretary of Labor under Franklin Roosevelt.17e
Many observers made the immediate connection between the
disaster and the failed recent garment workers strike. 177 As one
observer noted, "I remember their great strike of last year, in
which these girls demanded more sanitary workrooms, and more
safety precautions in the shops. These dead bodies told the
result."178 And unlike some industrial accidents, notably the far
less visible instance of coal and other mining disasters common at
the time, where the victims perished within their dark and
inaccessible workplaces (often unknown to anyone but their co-
workers, family, and friends), the Triangle fire produced the
indelible spectacle of public deaths, over and over again before a
crowd of thousands who had never, and would never again, see
anything like it.17
Nonetheless, labor activists had little hope that the fire,
dramatic as it was, would have any real impact on safety
173. See Jeanine Ferris Pirro, Reforming the Urban Workplace: The Legacy
of Frances Perkins, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1423, 1424-26 (1999) (explaining
the education background and past employment of Frances Perkins).
174. See VON DREHLE, supra note 114, at 195 (discussing Frances Perkin's
perceptions on the day of the fire).
175. Frances Perkins was named executive secretary of the Committee of
Safety formed by New York State in the aftermath of the Triangle fire. Id. at
1426-27.
176. Pirro, supra note 173, at 1427. Frances Perkins was the first woman
cabinet member in the United States: appointed as Secretary of Labor by
President Franklin in 1933. Id.
177. See VON DREHLE, supra note 114, at 193 (describing a public demand
for fire safety at the Metropolitan Opera House and a later funeral march); see
also STEIN, supra note 114, (stating "[lit was the same policemen who had
clubbed [the Triangle workers] back into submission who kept the thousands
in Washington Square from trampling upon their dead bodies, sent for
ambulances to carry them away and lifted them one by one into the receiving
coffins.").
178. VON DREHLE, supra note 114, at 177.
179. See Elizabeth V. Burt, Working Women and the Triangle Fire: Press
Coverage of A Tragedy, 30 JoURNALISM HIST. 189, 190 (2005) (noting
Reporters were on the scene within minutes to record the accounts of
eyewitnesses, stunned survivors, and grieving relatives, and
photographers provided gripping scenes of police and firefighters piling
charred and broken bodies in the street.... The story was picked up by
newspapers from coast to coast, and on their editorial pages many began
to ask how safe the factories in their own cities were. This had all of the
elements of a sensational story-the number of victims (146), the
character of the victims (mostly women, many of them girls), the
location (downtown New York City), the time (broad daylight), and the




conditions in factories.180 As socialist leader Meyer London
characteristically concluded, "[W]e will get an investigation that
will result in a law being referred to a committee that will report
in 1913. And by 1915 a law will be passed-and after that our
grafting officials will not enforce it!"181
But this prediction, justified as it was by London's experience
and the track record of the Tammany Democrats in the city and
state government, was wrong. The Triangle fire was the
undeniable initiating moment of a dramatic shift in New York
politics and regulatory policy, paving the way for the development
of substantial new administrative structures and regulatory
requirements. It was the paradigmatic "unresolvable regulatory
moment" punctuating the otherwise static equilibrium of
governmental workplace safety policy.
The initial legal response to the fire was the criminal
prosecution of Max Blanck and Isaac Harris by the District
Attorney's office.182 The two were quickly indicted on
manslaughter charges-with the intentional locking of the ninth
floor door as the main incriminating allegation.
But even as the indictments were issued, activists fought to
keep the post-fire attention on the broader issue of working
conditions in all of New York, not just in the Triangle factory, and
to use the fire as the motivating force for the kind of significant
regulatory change that they, and their past and present allies, had
been seeking for a generation.s83 This initiative was enhanced
when the criminal trial of Blanck and Harris ended in a not guilty
verdict in December of 1911.184 Legal culpability and blame for the
180. See Behrens, supra note 33, at 366 (describing the activists' skepticism,
which was partially the result of the 1909 strike).
181. VON DREHLE, supra note 114, at 171-73 (noting that Meyer's skepticism
was well-founded).
182. Id. at 180 (stating that District Attorney Whitman could have gone
"after the building department, which would cast the fire as a problem of the
bureaucracy, or he could go after the owners, which would cast the disaster as
an individual crime.").
183. A high degree of labor strife characterized the years near the turn of the
century in New York City. See Knights of Labor Tailors to Strike, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 7, 1894 (noting that city tailors will strike due to a wage dispute);
Injunctions in 'Labor Disputes,' N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 1903 (arguing that labor
leaders seek to employ "sterner" rather than "peaceful" measures to reach
their goals); Thousand New Men to Break Cab Strike, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 21,
1908 (discussing the employment of one thousand contractors coming into the
city to replace striking cab drivers).
184. The Meaning of an Acquittal, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 1911, reprinted in
BURT, supra note 129, at 221-22 (stating that the jury would have had to find
that the ninth-floor door was locked on Harris and Blanck's orders and that
the pair was "personally connected with and responsible for the death of one
particular victim," and the state could not meet this burden); see generally
STEIN, supra note 114, at 177-203 for a detailed description of the trial,
including testimony and arguments.
2011]1 387
The John Marshall Law Review
Triangle owners could have produced a sense that justice had been
done, and that the tragedy was the result of irresponsible and
reckless individuals and not something systematic about working
conditions and regulatory structures in the city. The acquittals
sent almost the opposite message, one more conducive to a broad
regulatory response: that the fire was the result not of an isolated
act of criminal cruelty or recklessness but was endemic of a flawed
and dangerous workplace environment.185
One of the activists who fought to use the fire as an impetus
for regulatory reform was Frances Perkins. She soon became a
central figure, along with two young Tammany-affiliated state
legislators, Alfred E. Smith and Robert F. Wagner,186 in post-fire
political mobilization that would change working conditions in
New York. By the time of the fire, Perkins was already working as
a lobbyist in Albany advocating for regulations of women and child
labor, and for workplace and fire safety. 187 Indeed, Perkins, after
personally witnessing the tragedy of the Triangle fire, had recently
learned that her primary legislative initiative, a fifty-four-hour
work-week, had been killed in the legislature at the behest of
powerful manufacturing interests188 who saw the working
limitations as a threat to their profits.189
After the fire, Smith told Perkins that a commission of
legislators, not well-meaning public advocates, was needed if any
substantial regulatory initiatives could be expected.190 He and
185. See Behrens, supra note 33, at 367 (describing how the trial had the
effect of keeping the fire in the public's consciousness, which aided the reform
movement).
186. Robert F. Wagner, at thirty-three, was installed as the youngest Senate
leader in New York history. While in the Assembly, Alfred E. Smith became
majority leader a few days after turning thirty-eight. [Charles] Murphy, the
saying went in Albany, had promoted the "kindergarten class." VON DREHLE,
supra note 114, at 200. Smith, Wagner and Perkins were all destined to wield
extensive political influence over the following few decades-Smith as a long-
time popular New York governor and presidential candidate (who governed, in
David Von Drehle's words, "as though the ghosts of the Triangle were looking
over his shoulder"), while Wagner and Perkins were founding architects of the
New Deal working with Smith's political successor in Washington, Franklin
Roosevelt. Id. at 262-63. And while all three could point to various reasons for
their success, the Triangle fire and its aftermath were the crucial moments for
all their careers, and consequently, for development of liberal social policy for
a generation or more. Id. at 262-63.
187. Id. at 199.
188. Smith confided in Perkins, at the time, that one of the forces opposed to
the bill was the Huyler candy company, a major contributor to the Democratic
party. Id. at 206.
189. Id. at 205.
190. Id. at 208. Smith's assessment of how ineffectual a committee of civic
leaders and activists would be mirrors at least one aspect of the public choice
school's basic calculus for why private interests invariably dominate broad
public concerns in any legislative battle-the inability of advocates for the
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Wagner spear-headed the creation of the Factory Investigating
Committee just three months after the fire, with nine members:
five legislators and four gubernatorial appointments, with
themselves, the two "Tammany Twins," as chairman and vice-
chairman respectively.19 1 The Commission was granted "the power
to subpoena witnesses and documents, to elect its own members,
to employ experts, and to change its own rules . . . [to] remake its
charter and replace its members."192 It hired a union official as
chief investigator, who in turn sent a team of ten more
investigators19 3 "into nearly two thousand factories, covering
twenty industries" by the end of 1911.194 The Commission heard
from 222 witnesses and inspected 1836 industrial establishments
during its tenure. 9 5 As historian Robert Slayton has observed, the
findings of the commission mirrored the initial public sense that
the Triangle disaster had been the result of a dearth of relevant
regulations.196
By the end of the year the commission had proposed fifteen
new laws addressing fire safety, workplace inspections, and
women's and children's labor, eight of which were ultimately
enacted.197 In 1912, the commission expanded the scope of its
investigation from the original nine cities to an additional forty-
six, and expanded its focus "far beyond simple fire safety to the
broader issue of industrial conditions."198 It proposed many more
bills, with twenty-five becoming law by the end of 1913.199 Perhaps
most significantly, the new legislation included a reorganization of
the state's Department of Labor to monitor and enforce these new
public interest to invest the kind of time and energy that the private interest
can always be counted on to display. Id.
191. Id. at 210.
192. Id. at 212. SLAYTON, supra note 125, at 93 (discussing the state's
limitations on the powers of the Commission).
193. One of the investigators was Clara Lemlich, a union activist and one of
the main instigators of the "uprising of the 20,000." VON DREHLE, supra note
114, at 213.
194. Id.
195. STEIN, supra note 114, at 208-09.
196. SLAYTON, supra note 125, at 94. "The problem, they discovered, was not
that the owners violated the safety codes but rather that the codes were far too
lax to protect workers' safety. The Asche Building, for example, was
considered a model of fireproofing, and in one sense it was: the building
remained relatively undamaged, while all inside perished." Id.
197. VON DREHLE, supra note 114, at 214.
198. SLAYTON, supra note 125, at 93. The Commission's focus "included fire
hazards, unsanitary working conditions, occupational illnesses, factory
inspection, tenement sweatshops, and the status of existing laws and
enforcement... . The broader scope of this commission, however, meant that
New York had become the first state in the country to launch a general
investigation into the conditions of industrial work." Id. at 94.
199. VON DREHLE, supra note 114, at 215.
2011]1 389
The John Marshall Law Review
requirementS200 and concentrated responsibility for fire prevention
in the city, previously divided between several departments, into
one Bureau of Fire Prevention.201 The Bureau was the first of its
kind in the country, and it gave the fire department unfettered
authority to carry out fire safety inspections without seeking prior
approval from the Bureau of Building, the Department of Water
Supply, or any other agencies with a less direct focus on safety
concerns. 202
The new rules and regulations, to an overwhelming extent,
mirrored the specific conditions that had caused or exacerbated
the Triangle disaster and demonstrated a genuine motivation not
merely to grandstand for political gain, but to identify and solve
real problems. 203 The new legislation required, among other
things, automatic sprinklers in high-rise buildings, fire drills in
workplaces, and fire doors to remain unlocked and swing outward
to allow more room for egress. 204 And the new regulations were
opposed vigorously by the manufacturing interests in the state and
imposed heavy financial and procedural burdens on employers
throughout the state.205
But the new rules also demonstrated the particular political
and emotional impact of the fire and the dominant public
narrative it fostered. Much of the immediate post-fire legislation
focused on workplace rules for women and children, suggesting,
along with much of the contemporary press coverage and public
statements by government officials, that the gender and age of the
majority of the fire's victims was one of the factors that created
such strong outrage and the correspondingly lasting initiative for
change. 206 While the furor for reform abated significantly by
1914,207 the Commission had already achieved remarkable
changes in the law, making New York one of the forerunners of
200. Id. at 215. The post-fire political focus on the issues of working people
and recent immigrants had the effect that Charles Murphy and other
Tammany leaders had hoped. See id. at 217-18 (stating that Tammany had its
largest state-wide victory ever in autumn 1913).
201. SLAYTON, supra note 125, at 99.
202. Id.
203. See SLAYTON, supra note 125, at 98-99 (providing examples of how the
Commission's rules and regulations are still in force today).
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. As Professor Slayton writes:
Investigators roamed through the tenements, fining sweatshops where
women worked by street light to save the cost of gas, unaffordable on
their slim wages. Children cried from exhaustion, their parents' only
response to urge their small fingers on, paste another petal on the
artificial flower, in the rush to earn a few pennies more for bread.
SLAYTON, supra note 125, at 95.
207. Only three of the Commission's bills passed during that year. Behrens,
supra note 33, at 371.
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modern workplace safety reform. The period following the Triangle
fire is even now remembered as "the golden era of remedial factory
legislation" and has justly been called a "turning point" in social
progress. Frances Perkins noted," The extent to which the
legislation in New York marked a change in American political
attitudes and policies toward social responsibility can scarcely be
overrated."208 This administrative expansion influenced the federal
administrative boom of the following decade, and the post-Triangle
legal structures in New York "became the model for federal laws
on these subjects."209
A combination of factors made the Triangle fire perhaps the
paradigmatic unresolvable moment of twentieth century
administrative evolution.210 First, it was a dramatic public
disaster that was experienced by a large number of people and
remained a topic of great public interest for a long time. Second,
the story that arose from the fire, and which became the
conventional narrative, was simple and compelling: young girls
crammed into a factory, who had only recently fought for safer
working conditions, died in horrible ways, and no one could find a
law that was violated or someone to blame. Third, the fire was not
a one-time aberrational event that could be dismissed as a passed
tragedy-there was an ongoing and immediate potential for
recurrence of a similar catastrophe. Fourth, there was nothing
idiosyncratic about the cause of the event-the owners of the
factory were not convicted for some kind of special malice, and the
factory itself was not a fringe sweatshop that would have been an
embarrassment to the industry, but instead was a modern and
somewhat safe workplace based on the standards of the time. And
finally, a committee was appointed by a relevant legislative body
with authority to both investigate the causes of the disaster and
make recommendations for new legislation and regulation that
might make the recurrence of a similar event significantly less
likely. Perhaps this feature is the most important, as the post-
Triangle fire commission was able to focus the kind of specific
political activism for reforms that was at least designed to serve
208. Id. See also SLAYTON, supra note 125, at 98 (explaining how New York's
reputation as a leader in manufacturing safety developed following the fire
and subsequent reforms).
209. Pirro, supra note 173, at 1427. The broad national impact of this
legislative explosion in New York in the early twentieth century was enhanced
by the historical coincidence of Perkins, and other key figures in the post-
Triangle drama, taking on important positions in the federal government in
the 1930s. Id.
210. See Seth D. Harris, Conceptions of Fairness and the Fair Labor
Standards Act, 18 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 19, 60-61 (2000) (describing that
the Triangle fire caused massive deaths that led to public outcry for reform,
which ultimately culminated in the creation of the New York State Factory
Investigating Commission and an overhaul of New York labor laws).
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the broad public that could challenge and ultimately defeat the
entrenched private interests that otherwise so effectively stifle any
real change in the regulatory status quo.
The focus on regulations governing women and the young in
workplaces is testament to the formative impact of the fire, of the
compelling narrative that arose from it, and its particular impact
on the regulatory evolution that followed. It is also an indication of
the importance played not only by the disastrous events
themselves, but by the dominant societal narrative that developed
to explain the events and their significance to the polity as a
whole. It is indeed the story that is initiated by, and flows from,
these dramatic events that serves as the critical mechanism in the
punctuated evolution of the administrative structure because of its
impact in energizing otherwise nascent and diffuse public opinion
in support of regulatory change.
2. The Mississippi River Flood of 1927
Unlike many disasters that break suddenly on unsuspecting
victims, the Mississippi flood of 1927 developed slowly over the
course of many months under the watchful and anxious eyes of
millions. Consistent heavy rains began to fall throughout the
Mississippi River valley211 in August 1926 and did not abate for six
months.212 The result, by April 1927, was rising water and ever-
increasing anxiety in Mississippi River communities from Illinois
to New Orleans.213 Most officials responsible for flood prevention
publicly expressed confidence that the system of leveeS214 that
protected much of the lower Mississippi, from Southern Illinois
south to the Gulf of Mexico, would hold.215 When the river reached
flood stage in Cairo, Illinois on January 1, 1927, Congressional
"representatives from Mississippi, Alabama, and Tennessee wired
their respective governors to find out if they should seek federal
aid for their flooded districts. The governors unanimously wired
211. See JOHN M. BARRY, RISING TIDE: THE GREAT MISSISSIPPI FLOOD OF
1927 AND How IT CHANGED AMERICA 173-82 (Simon & Schuster 1997) (noting
that the Mississippi River valley covers much of the continental landmass
between Montana and New York).
212. Id. at 173-82.
213. Id. at 187-88. The rain first began in the region during summer and
persisted in intensity resulting in the destruction of crops and the rising of the
river causing anxiety to increase amongst the public during this period. Id. at
173-74.
214. See id. at 190 (describing the general structure and function of levees,
which are huge, usually earthen, structures built on the banks of the river
high enough, supposedly, both to hold the water in its banks and concentrate
pressure downward to create a deeper riverbed).




back that no help was needed."216 A month later, when more heavy
rains caused flooding in New Orleans, the chairman of the
Mississippi River Commission 217 assured the public that while the
river was "high for [that] time of year, no serious trouble with flood
waters [was] expected [that] spring unless more rain than usual
fell in the upper valley and tributaries." 218
This optimism 219 was misplaced, however, as serious fears
soon began to grow as rivers in the Mississippi system were
flooding throughout the country. 220 Emergency mechanisms were
finally employed to keep the water in its banks.221 "The Mississippi
National Guard was mobilized to guard the levees" to prevent
residents of one area from damaging or destroying levees in
another area in order to relieve the pressure and force the
seemingly inevitable flood waters to wash away homes in a
neighboring community instead of their own.222 The chief engineer
of the Mississippi Levee Board asked for money to raise the low
spots in the Mississippi Delta for two months until supplies were
finally received. 223
The reliance on levees as the only mechanism for flood
prevention had been a point of contention for decades. 224 But by
1885, the Mississippi River Commission had reached the
conclusion, clearly erroneous by even contemporary engineering
standards, that the levee system served as a sufficient flood
prevention device by "scouring and enlarging" the river beds and
channel, allowing for more water to flow without escaping the
river banks.225 To a great extent, this acceptance of the levees-only
model was mandated by the fact that no financial support was
available for any other flood prevention structures or policies.
Before 1927, the states in the Mississippi region did not have the
resources to institute other flood prevention plans, and the notion
216. Id. at 179.
217. The Mississippi River Commission is the body entrusted with managing
the Mississippi flood plane. Id. at 157.
218. Id. at 182. In early 1927, the head of the Mississippi River
Commission's Memphis district declared that "if the river does not go any
higher than has been forecast by the meteorologist at Memphis, no serious
trouble with the United States levee system is anticipated." Id. at 183.
219. Id. at 175 (stating that U.S. Weather Bureau data indicated that the
river gauges at the end of 1926 on the three largest rivers in North America-
the Ohio, the Missouri, and the Mississippi-were the highest on record, and
that a flood the following spring was not unexpected).
220. Pittsburgh flooded on January 23, and Cincinnati flooded five days
later. Id. at 181.
221. Id. at 162.
222. Id. at 182.
223. Id. at 182-83.
224. See id. at 21-92 (discussing in depth, Mississippi River flood prevention
efforts in the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries).
225. Id. at 157.
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that the federal government should step in to provide funds for the
creation and improvement of the national infrastructure was
anathema.226 The levee-reliant policy was also a product of
authority for decision making being placed in the hands of officials
with limited expertise in the substantive scientific areas relevant
to flood management 227 and in the unwillingness of these officials
to challenge what had become the conventional wisdom. 228
As labor was mobilized to perform the tasks necessary to fight
back the river, the same racial dynamics that had always governed
life in the Mississippi Valley applied. Masses of black laborerS229
were organized under small numbers of white supervisors, in
difficult and dehumanizing conditions, in an attempt to avoid or
limit the coming disaster.230 Blacks were forcibly pressed into
service as sandbaggers in an attempt to forestall overflow of the
levees, 231 while at the same time restricted from any duties that
might involve possible violence against whites. 232
On April 16, the first Mississippi River Commission levee
crumbled at Dorena, Missouri. The Commission had insisted up
until then that "[t]here [had] never been a single break nor a
single acre of land flooded by a break on a levee constructed
according to Government specifications . . . . The river poured
through the breach, tearing down trees, sweeping away buildings,
and destroying faith."233 Many levees upriver from Mississippi
collapsed in the days that followed. 234 And then the weather got
even worse, with violent storms hitting the area on April 19 and
20, bringing both heavy rain and high winds and producing waves
that pounded against the sides of the levees.235 Much of the
increasingly frantic disaster prevention efforts focused on a
particularly vulnerable section of the levee complex, at Mounds
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. As one expert on flood control observed at the time:
It is so much easier to believe than to think; it is astounding how much
more believing is done than thinking. It is more astounding that an
honest study was not made of conditions resulting from [the levees-only
policy]. Not only was essential data not available but it appeared as
though the failure to acquire it was deliberate. The determination to
carry out this impossible theory was so great that, with many, it
appeared to be an obsession.
Id. at 160.
229. Up to 30,000 black laborers worked the plantations in the Delta region,
and would have no real choice but to answer the call when flood prevention
(and later flood relief) workers were needed. Id. at 184.
230. Id. at 183-84.
231. Id. at 195-96.
232. Id. at 192.
233. Id. at 194.
234. Id. at 194-98.
235. Id. at 198.
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Landing just north of Greenville, Mississippi.236
At 6:30 a.m. on April 21, a small break opened in the levee at
Mounds Landing.237 At gunpoint, hundreds of black men worked to
fill the growing break, filling sandbags and throwing them into the
breach, but to no avail. 238 Maude Williams, 239 a fourteen-year-old
girl from the outskirts of Greenville, Mississippi, sat with her
family on the roof of their home in Mounds Plantation, watching
the mighty, muddy, Mississippi roll by. The house was almost
completely submerged by water.240 The next day, a boat came to
rescue Maude, her parents, and her four brothers and sisters and
take them to a shelter in downtown Greenville where she and her
family would live for the next several months.
A total of 185,459 people had lived in the affected portion of
the Mississippi Delta directly in the path of the escaping water;
there is no record of how many of them died.241 Approximately
thirty thousand fled soon after the levee gave way, but most
stayed, living in makeshift shelters and camps. 242 The sheer
enormity of the catastrophe243 grabbed the attention of
newspapers from coast to coast, and pleas for help splashed across
the headlines.244
President Coolidge, who had ignored repeated calls from the
governors of several states in the Ohio-Mississippi flood plane for
months, 245 finally called a meeting on the day after the Mounds
236. Id. at 198-200.
237. Id. at 200.
238. Id. "The water poured through in a growing torrent, washing the
sandbags away as fast as they threw them in. Under their feet the levee
quivered, shook. The breach was wider, deeper. The river was overflowing the
levee along a front of several miles." Id. at 201.
239. Maude Williams, who married Hilliard Coleman in 1941, is the mother
of Marianne Coleman Niles and the grandmother of the author of this Article.
240. BARRY, supra note 212, at 201.
241. Id. at 206. According to the Mississippi Historical Society, in the flood
in Mississippi alone "a total of 41,673 homes were flooded; 21,836 buildings
were destroyed; 62,089 buildings were damages; and 2,836 work animals,
6,873 cattle, 31,740 hogs, and 266,786 poultry were drowned. And an entire
crop year was lost." Princella W. Nowell, The Flood of 1927 and Its Impact in
Greenville, Mississippi, MISSISSIPPI HISTORY Now, http://mshistory.kl2.ms.us/
articles/230/the-flood-of-1927-and-its-impact-in-greenville-mississippi (last
visited Mar. 16, 2011).
242. BARRY, supra note 211, at 206.
243. Friedman & Thompson, supra note 28, at 269. "The great flood of 1927
on the Mississippi River left a total of 16,570,627 acres under water, an area
stretching over parts of seven states and home to a population of 4,459,238
people. In all, 162,017 homes were flooded, 41,487 buildings destroyed, and
$102,562,395 worth of crops lost." Id.
244. BARRY, supra note 211, at 208-09.
245. Id. at 262.
Even before the Mounds Landing crevasse, the governors of Oklahoma,
Illinois, Missouri, Kentucky, Arkansas, and Mississippi had begged
Coolidge for help and asked him to name Commerce Secretary Herbert
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Landing crevasse to discuss what form a federal government
response to the tragedy might take. 246 He appointed Herbert
Hoover, then Commerce Secretary, as the chair of a five-member
cabinet-level committee to investigate the issue, make
recommendations, and implement needed programs. 247 Hoover
gathered as much information as he could about the flood and its
victims. He initially saw the post-flood efforts as "more ambitious
than a simple provision of goods," but instead as a calculated effort
to "end the dependence of the region on cotton and sugar by
distributing soybean and other vegetable seeds, which he believed
would 'lift the entire region out of squalor,' 248 but when his
committee concluded that there was no immediate fix that would
avoid another catastrophe like the Mounds Landing crevasse, 249 he
focused instead on providing relief for the victims and on regional
rehabilitation. 250 Hoover's committee placed local Red Cross
chapters, already established in most locations, in charge of
delivering and coordinating relief. 251 Hoover also quickly and
efficiently streamlined the relief system by centralizing policy and
decentralizing execution. 252
By mid-May 1927, Hoover had turned his focus to regional
reconstruction. 253 He planned to reduce the region's dependence on
cotton by introducing new cropS254 and provided seeds so that
refugees could grow vegetable gardens. 255 He developed a credit
Hoover head of a special rescue effort. Hoover had repeatedly solved
massive logistics problems of feeding hundreds of thousands of people.




248. Freidman & Thompson, supra note 28, at 272. "The reconstruction
effort was (in Hoover's view) not purely an act of charity. Rather, the project
was, Hoover felt, 'based on self-help, credit, employment and relief." Id.
249. Id. at 212.
250. Id. at 272.
251. BARRY, supra note 211, at 274. The Red Cross had first come to national
prominence in the United States as a result of its role in the disaster relief for
another historic American flood, the Johnstown Flood of 1889. See Friedman &
Thompson, Total Disaster and Total Justice: Responses to Man-Made Tragedy,
supra note 36, at 252 (stating that 2209 people died in the flood, which was
the result of a poorly designed and maintained dam failing during a fierce rain
storm).
252. See BARRY, supra note 211, at 274. (stating that this arrangement
worked well for Hoover, and "in case of scandal Baker pointed out
decentralizing would put responsibility 'squarely on the local community and
not the national organization . . . . Therefore, criticism may be localized very
definitely.").
253. Id. at 365. He announced the beginning of his reconstruction efforts on
May 27, 1927. Id.
254. Id. at 366.
255. Id. at 365-66.
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and loan system, believing that it would provide the South with
the means to lift itself from the flood-induced squalor. 256 But
Hoover's plans required a great deal of money, and there was no
ready or obvious source of funds.257 The federal government,
although enjoying an extensive budget surplus, provided no direct
relief funding.258 Hoover thus turned to private sources of
financing,259 but unfortunately, only a small fraction of the funds
was actually translated into loans for flood victims. 260 Of the
money that was made available, many of the people who needed it
most lacked the collateral to borrow, 261 or could not afford the
interest rates associated with loans offered by commercial
banks.262 The bank-funded reconstruction efforts consequently
accomplished little in the way of extensive financial assistance,
suggesting to many the limited "ability of the private sector alone
to meet a crisis" of this magnitude. 263
Those frustrated by the insufficiency of the early government-
organized, privately-funded relief efforts included several
members of Congress. Legislators besieged President Coolidge
with calls for the commencement of a special session of Congress
with the goal of drafting federal legislation to provide needed
relief.264 Coolidge refused to call for such a session.265 Some
prominent members of the press defended his decision on the
grounds that the situation could and should be addressed without
the direct involvement of the federal government. 266 Most of the
nation's media, however, saw and expressed the need for federal
involvement to resolve such an extensive personal and financial
disaster.267
256. Id. at 366. Hoover believed "the key to rebuilding . .. was credit." Id.
Hoover had an enlightened, selfish, and political-economic approach. His plan
reflected his own economic values: Its goal was not to provide for the refugees,
but rather to help the refugees provide for themselves. Id. at 370.
257. Id. at 369.
258. Id. at 371.
259. Id. at 371.
260. See id. at 377 (stating that "[i]n the end, the Mississippi corporation
made loans amounting to barely 5 percent of what Hoover had envisioned, and
the Arkansas and Louisiana corporations did little better.").
261. Id. at 375-76.
262. Id.
263. Id. at 377.
264. Id. at 372.
265. See BARRY, supra note 211, at 372. Congress was not going to convene
until January 1928. Id. The Red Cross would not spend money reinforcing the
levees and the Army funds were exhausted; "legally, Congress had to pass an
appropriations bill." Id.
266. See id. (stating that "[tihe New York Times applauded Coolidge's
refusal to convene Congress and deemed Hoover's program sufficient:
'Fortunately, there are still some things that can be done without the wisdom
of Congress and the all-fathering Federal Government."').
267. See Friedman & Thompson, supra note 28, at 273.
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The leading historian of the flood and its aftermath has
identified the efforts as a "watershed" in the national
consciousness concerning the proper role of the federal government
in responding to the consequences of dramatic public disasters. 268
John Barry referred to the growing calls for a federal role in the
relief efforts as the moment "when the nation first demanded that
the federal government assume a new kind of responsibility for its
citizens."269
Herbert Hoover, ambitious as his post-flood plans had been,
did not ride the new wave of opinion about the role of the federal
government, and he and the President continued to promote and
implement privately funded relief efforts. 270 He used his personal
relationships and political influence to quiet demands for a special
congressional session, and personally rebutted media attacks on
his reconstruction plan.271 In his annual message to Congress,
President Coolidge made a strong argument against the use of
federal funds to provide relief for the flood victims, noting that:
The Government is not an insurer of its citizens against the hazard
of the elements. We shall always have flood and drought, heat and
cold, earthquake and wind, lightning and tidal wave . . . . The
Government does not undertake to reimburse its citizens for loss
and damage incurred under such circumstances. 272
Even as the inability of the private efforts to get the needed
funds to victims became clear, Hoover continued to tout the
success of his privately funded emergency response regime. 273
While Hoover was campaigning for and implementing his rehabilitation
program, many people called for President Coolidge to convene a special
session of Congress to discuss the appropriation of federal relief funds
for the flood victims. Newspapers throughout the country ran editorials
pleading with the President to call on Congress to meet and provide
relief-a special session that would respond to the 'grave crisis' facing
victims.
Id.
268. See, e.g., BARRY, supra note 211, at 374 outlining the devastating effects
of the infamous flood).
269. Id.
270. See Friedman & Thompson, supra note 28, at 271.
On April 22, 1927, just days after the break at Mounds Landing,
President Calvin Coolidge made a national appeal for contributions to
the Red Cross. In a meeting with Red Cross officials on that day, it was
decided that $5 million would be needed to sustain the relief effort.
Id.
271. See BARRY, supra note 211, at 323 (demonstrating Hoover's deceiving
schemes with his political peers).
272. Friedman & Thompson, supra note 28, at 273.
273. It was not the only controversy that Hoover would struggle to cover and
suppress during the course of the flood. BARRY, supra note 211, at 322-23. He
would also minimize damaging media coverage of the atrocities in Greenville
Mississippi Id. In doing so, he would develop a relationship with Robert Russa
Moton that would ultimately sour, likely costing him a significant percentage
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Meanwhile, hundreds of thousands lived in camps for months,
their livelihoods destroyed.274
As the waters finally began to recede in the late summer,275
President Coolidge appointed a quartet of southern political
leaders to focus less on the call for direct federal relief for victims
and more on the development of long-term flood control policies
and procedures.276 The unique role of the Mississippi River in the
American economy and ecology, and the vast impact of its periodic
flooding, was providing justification, even for Coolidge, for
considering some kind of orchestrated federal response.277
While broad and innovative action was contemplated,278 it
only took half an hour for the men to agree on the basic framework
of the legislation.279 Up until this bill, local areas were generally
required to match federal expenditures on flood projects.280 The
committee knew that a bill that sought to buck this standard too
openly would be destined for political failure, including promised
opposition from the President, 281 who noted that it would be
"revolutionary" and "unwise" for the federal government to pay for
the entire flood protection program. 282 At the same time, there was
no way that the devastated region could come up with any
significant funds. 283 The committee envisioned a one-time
exception to the matching requirement: Because local state
spending on flood control and relief already outweighed the federal
of the black vote in his campaign for re-election against FDR. Id.
274. Id. at 285-86.
275. Id. at 285.
276. Friedman & Thompson, supra note 28, at 274.
277. Id.
Throughout 1927, along with calls for federal relief funds for flood
victims, there were calls for federal control measures on the Mississippi
and its tributaries. There seemed to be a growing national consensus
that flooding on the river was a national problem and that the federal
government should assume control of flood control projects. As Senator
James E. Watson asked rhetorically, "If thirty-one states drain into the
Mississippi and if more than 600,000 of our own people in these great
river States are rendered homeless and destitute by the flood, due
largely to that cause, does not that make it a national problem?"
Id.
278. See BARRY, supra note 211, at 399 (stating that "it would be the most
ambitious and extensive single piece of legislation Congress had ever
passed.").
279. Id. at 403.
280. Id. at 401-02.
281. Friedman & Thompson, supra note 28, at 273. President Coolidge
argued that the states "should share with the Federal Government the burden
of assisting the levee districts and individual property owners, especially in
view of the fact that the States benefit directly by the increased taxes from
land made more valuable by reason of its protection." Id. at 274.
282. Id. at 274-75.
283. See BARRY, supra note 211, at 401-02 (describing many local levee
districts as being financially destitute).
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government spending, the requirement would be waived. 284 But
the committee concluded that it would not ask for direct federal
monetary relief for the flood victims, fearing that such a request
would be the motivation not to provide a long-term flood
prevention infrastructure. 285
Notwithstanding its myriad limitations, the federal law that
would ultimately arise out of these proposals, the 1928 Flood
Control Act, was a significant moment in the evolution of the
administrative structures in the United States. It marked the
federal government's "acceptance of federal responsibility for flood
control,"286 and brought a level of federal "involvement in state and
local affairs that was largely unprecedented."287 President
Coolidge signed the law on May 15, 1928, and it provided $325
million to be used to develop flood control mechanisms, mostly in
the lower Mississippi Valley.288 It provided a ten-year plan for
flood control and constituted the "largest public works project
undertaken up to that time in the United States."289 It also
included a provision expressly limiting civil liability for the federal
government as a result of any flood control related activity. 290
While an expensive bill adjudged by contemporary standards, it
did not provide for direct aid to any flood victims. 291 Nonetheless,
it was hailed at the time by one of its sponsors as "the greatest
piece of legislation ever enacted by Congress," and by historian
John Barry as setting "a precedent of direct, comprehensive, and
vastly expanded federal involvement in local affairs" and a "major
shift in what the nation considered the proper role and obligations
of national government, a shift that both presaged and prepared
the way for far greater changes that would soon come."292
284. Id. at 402.
285. Id. at 401.
286. Saul Jay Singer, Flooding the Fifth Amendment: The National Flood
Insurance Program and the "Takings" Clause, 17 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV.
323, 334 (1990).
287. Friedman & Thompson,, supra note 28, at 270.
288. Id. at 275.
289. Mary Jean Pederson, Boudreau v. United States: Government Immunity
Under the Flood Control Act of 1928 and the Effect of Outdated Legislation on
Society, 41 VILL. L. REV. 1487, 1488 (1996) ("It is clear from the legislative
history of the Act that Congress's decision to undertake such an expensive
project was based on its desire to protect citizens' property from any future
flood disasters and a strong humanitarian concern for those who suffered as a
result of the 1927 flood.").
290. See id. at 1493 (stating that "[tihe remarks of Representative Snell,
Chairman of the House Rules Committee in 1928, indicate that Congress's
purpose in enacting section 702(c) was to allow the government to establish
federal public works projects near flood prone rivers, while at the same time
limit the government's liability resulting from those projects.").
291. Friedman & Thompson, supra note 28, at 275.
292. BARRY, supra note 211, at 406-07.
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The 1927 flood can be seen as another "unresolvable
regulatory moment" within the punctuated equilibrium model of
administrative evolution. This time, however, the impact was not
on government regulation of a particular area of law but on the
broader attitude of the government about the scope of its role. The
dominant attitude before the flood was that disaster relief was the
province of individuals and irivate-sector charities. But the
Mississippi flood was too large a problem, and one impacting too
many different states and regions of the nation, to be solved or
even effectively addressed by even a coordinated private response.
While there have been flawed federal responses to many later
disasters, including the aftermath of flooding in the same region of
the country after Hurricane Katrina in 2005,293 there has never
been any doubt since 1927, at any point on the political spectrum,
that the federal government bears primary responsibility for
responding to the devastation caused by natural disasters and to
preventing or alleviating that impact where possible.
While certainly not the only factor leading to this shift in
focus, 29 4 the Mississippi flood of 1927 was perhaps the most
significant turning point.295 Much like the Triangle fire, which was
far from the first or even most serious workplace disaster in the
293. For a discussion of the governmental role in Katrina relief, see
generally William P. Quigley, Obstacle to Opportunity: Housing that Working
and Poor People can Afford in New Orleans Since Katrina, 42 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 393 (2007); Sandra Selmer, A Tale of Two Imperiled Rivers: Reflections
from a Post-Katrina World, 59 FLA. L. REV. 599 (2007); Wendy B. Scott, From
an Act of God to the Failure of Man: Hurricane Katrina and the Economic
Recovery of New Orleans, 51 VILL. L. REV. 581 (2006); and Meredith M. Stead,
Implementing Disaster Relief Through Tax Expenditures: An Assessment of the
Katrina Emergency Tax Relief Measures, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2158 (2006).
294. See Friedman & Thompson, supra note 28, at 251 (noting that "over the
last century-and-a-half or so, attitudes toward calamity have changed
dramatically. What was once accepted or reviled as inevitable, or fate, came to
be seen as somehow anomalous and (more importantly) as giving rise to a
claim for relief or payment . . . . Accidents had to be somebody's fault; and
somebody should pay. Or, if nobody was at fault, government or some
insurance program must take care of the problem .. .. Compensation became
normal; and the more normal it became, the more it became expected.").
295. BARRY, supra note 211, at 422.
The Great Mississippi River Flood of 1927 forced many small steps.
Even in the narrowest and most direct sense the flood's legacy was felt
in Washington, in New Orleans, in Greenville, in every community
along the banks of the Mississippi River and its tributary rivers, and in
the nation's black community . . . it shifted perceptions on the role and
responsibility of the federal government--calling for a great expansion-
and shattered the myth of a quasi-feudal bond between Delta blacks and
the southern aristocracy, in which the former pledged fealty to the latter
in return for protection. It accelerated the great migration of blacks
north. And it altered both southern and national politics. The changes
would not all come quickly. But they would come.
Id.
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United States,296 the Mississippi flood was not the first
devastating flood to hit in the United States. But prior floods,
including the Johnstown Flood in Pennsylvania in 1889 that killed
more than 2000 people,297 did not have the same broad impact on
the evolution of the federal administrative state. Perhaps because
the Johnstown flood involved an isolated dam that could be readily
identified as poorly managed over a number of years, as opposed to
a system of levees covering thousands of miles at the very heart of
the nation's agricultural and trading center, and perhaps because
it occurred in an era when the federal administrative structure
was still in its early infancy, the primary response to the
Johnstown flood involved a cascade of donations from private
parties and state and foreign governments, not a mobilization of
federal relief mechanisms. 298 As James Lawrence Fly, then
General Counsel of the Tennessee Valley Authority, noted in 1938,
the 1927 flood "destroyed whatever remained of insular thinking
on the flood problem. With dramatic suddenness it brought home
to the nation its second major responsibility in the control of
inland waters [in addition to ensuring their navigability]."299 Fly
further noted that "with the occurrence of the 1927 flood disaster,
there developed a general recognition that the control of a great
flood is a national problem which can only be solved by the most
comprehensive national measures."300  Once the federal
government took on the responsibility for addressing this critical
area of national life, the path was open, particularly during and
after the Great Depression that was just a few years away, for
296. The 1860 collapse and fire at the Pemberton Mill in Lawrence,
Massachusetts killed 145 and injured 166. The Fall of the Pemberton Mill,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 1886, at 1.
297. JOHNSTOWN FLOOD MUSEUM, Facts about the Johnstown Flood, http://
www.jaha.org/FloodMuseum/facts.html (last visited Apr. 19, 2011).
298. See Friedman & Thompson, supra note 28, at 256 (noting that "[t]he
reaction to this disaster was, in short, typical of the late nineteenth century
(and earlier). Relief was the responsibility of private charities. The 'accident'
was attributed to natural forces and [it was], thus, nobody's fault. If there was
blame-and many people thought there was, or should be-the remedy, if any,
lay in punishing the guilty.").
299. James Lawrence Fly, Role of the Federal Government in the
Conservation and Utilization of Water Resources, 86 U. PA. L. REV. 274, 281
(1938).
300. Id. at 283. With the federal governments response (or lack thereof) to
the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina in New Orleans and other parts of the
Gulf Coast, there was no longer any serious debate about whether the federal
government had an appropriate role to play in providing relief to those
affected by the disaster. Indeed the focus on post-Katrina analysis has been
the failure of the federal and local governments in meeting long standing
obligations to provide the kind of relief that was unprecedented in 1927 after
the great flood. See also supra notes 288-95 and accompanying text (discussing
the enactment of the 1928 Flood Control Act, which vastly expanded the
federal government's involvement in flood control activities).
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extending federal attention to other areas of national importance.
C. The Monongah Mine Incident: Disaster Without
Regulatory Change
1. The Monongah Disaster
On Friday, December 6, 1907, mines six and eight at the
Monongah mining facility in Fairmont, West Virginia, exploded.301
The blast,302 of uncertain origin,303 was so powerful it destroyed
the brick power-house, flung a ten-ton fan a half-mile, and could
be heard eight miles away.304 Perhaps as many as 550 coal
miners,305 men and boys, died in the underground explosion. 06 A
301. DANIEL CURRAN, DEAD LAWS FOR DEAD MEN: THE POLITICS OF
FEDERAL COAL MINE HEALTH AND SAFETY LEGISLATION 61 (Univ. of
Pittsburgh Press 1993). The mine was owned by Consolidation Coal and
operated by the Fairmont Coal Company. Id. The Consolidation Coal
Company, which owned the Monongah mines at the time of the disaster,
owned more than one hundred mines in West Virginia and Kentucky and
340,000 acres of land throughout Appalachia. Id. at 62-63.
302. Id. at 65.
Mine operators increasingly placed a premium on productivity, a
strategy that simultaneously encouraged carelessness through the
production initiative. This production orientation brought with it a
greater use of explosives or blown-out shots, which increased the
likelihood of disaster. Basically, the term blown-out shot refers to the
placement of an explosive into a pre-drilled hole in a seam of coal. At the
time of the disaster, one of these blown-out shots was cited as the cause
of the explosion at the Monongah mines. According to some accounts,
the shot that caused the disaster had been improperly made by
inexperienced miners who used a massive amount of powder hoping to
dislodge maximum coal. It was estimated that the miners set off a shot
that had the power to volatilize over fifty tons of coal and created over
two hundred cubic feet of explosive gases.
Id.
303. See id. at 66 (describing the original theory that too much gun powder
had been placed in a charge was later dispelled sixty-five years later when a
former employee stated that a fifty-pound case of dynamite had been left near
the explosion site); see also DAVIT MCATEER, MONONGAH: THE TRAGIC STORY
OF THE 1907 MONONGAH MINE DISASTER, THE WORSE INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT
IN U.S. HISTORY 160-62 (W. Va. Univ. Press 2007) 161-62 (summarizing the
three theories as to what caused the accident at Monongah: The mining
company claimed a boy playing with powder set off the explosion, while
objective experts argued that either a runaway coal train sparked methane
gas or coal dust, or that a blown out shot ignited gas or dust throughout the
mine).
304. MCATEER, supra note 303, at 116-17.
305. See JEFF GOODELL, BIG COAL: THE DIRTY SECRET BEHIND AMERICA'S
ENERGY FUTURE 56 (Houghton Mifflin Co. 2006) (explaining that "[s]ome
historians believe that as many as 550 miners were killed at Monongah ....
Although the coal company kept an accurate record of the number of mules
working in the mine, it never bothered to count the number of men, and after
the disaster, the mine was sealed up before all the bodies could be recovered.").
306. See CURRAN, supra note 301, at 61 (noting that the "official record
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fifteen-year-old miner was thrown, burning, two hundred yards by
the blast.307 When rescuers entered the mine they found horrific
scenes: "A headless body sat in the seat of a cutting machine, its
hands still gripping the handles of the machine . . . . Some
[miners] were completely destroyed, others were split open as a
result of being thrown violently against the mine."30 8 Other men
suffocated: "one held a pencil and paper in his hands. . . . One
miner was found with a spoon in his hand, eating his last meal."309
Only one miner survived the Monongah disaster.310
Miner fatalities were common occurrences in the industry at
the time,3 11 but "[tlhe large number of deaths and the spectacular
way in which the miners died meant that the Monongah disaster
received much media coverage."312 Much as the Triangle fire would
in the next decade, the Monongah disaster focused public attention
across the United States onto safety concerns posed by the
industry. But unlike the Triangle fire, the resulting public
attention failed to foster the development of a new regulatory
dynamic.
The Monongah mine had been considered a "model" mine up
until the time of the accident. 313 Many of the miners were recent
immigrants, lured from Europe by recruiters of the mining
industry. 314 While all men, the list of dead included the full
spectrum of American racial and ethnic demographics, with large
numbers of white and African-American victims, along with
miners recently, and not so recently, emigrated from Northern and
Eastern Europe. 315 The xenophobia that pervaded the nation at
shows that 361 miners lost their lives in the Monongah disaster').
307. MCATEER, supra note 303, at 118.
308. Id. at 139.
309. Id.
310. CURRAN, supra note 301, at 61.
311. See id. (stating that "[bly far the worst coal mining year was 1907. From
all causes, over 3,000 perished with [eight separate explosions killing 1,148
miners]. But in one month alone of that year, the last one, a climax of horrors
was reached as 'officially' 702 miners were killed from explosions: two in
Pennsylvania, one each in West Virginia, Alabama, and New Mexico
territory."); see also MINING SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN., Coal Fatalities for
1900 Through 2010, http://www.msha.gov/stats/centurystats/coalstats.asp
(last visited Apr. 19, 2011) (indicating that at no point before 1945 did fewer
than 1000 coal miners die in a year in the United States).
312. CURRAN, supra note 301, at 61.
313. See YOUTUBE, Monongah 1907 Mine Disaster, http://www.youtube.coml
watch?v-8Nq2ryRSdpk (last visited Apr. 19, 2011) (showing a clip of a
documentary by Davitt McAteer, former Assistant Secretary for Mine Safety
and Health at the Department of Labor, regarding the Monongah Mine
Disaster).
314. See id. (noting the arguments against safety regulation included
elements of classism and racism-'these people," poor immigrants, did not
need health and safety regulation).
315. See MONONGAH MINES RELIEF COMMI'IEE, HISTORY OF THE
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the time impacted the public response to the disaster. 316
The accident generated significant and full-throated media
coverage, exemplified by this account from the Pittsburgh
Dispatch:
What had first seemed like distant thunder, in a few seconds was
transformed into a roar of a thousand Niagaras. Like an eruption of
a volcano the blazing gas rushed to the surface, and vomited
tongues of red flame and clouds of dust through the slopes. The
thirty foot fan which supplied fresh air [to Mine Number Eight] was
lifted like a toy and wafted across the river. Poor little Charles
Honaker, fifteen years old, a trapper, with clothing ablaze, literally
a human torch, was enveloped in the fiery torrent. Several men who
were in the mine near the entrance were likewise carried in the
claws of death and strewn in the pit mouth.317
Accounts of this kind were not exaggerations. "Streets sagged
as mine tunnels collapsed; buildings shook and windows rattled or
shattered; fire and smoke belched from both portals of the mine"3 18
The immediate response of the public was unprecedented. Twenty-
five thousand people came to Monongah to see the disaster site,
requiring the presence of the National Guard,3 19 with one rail-
company providing a special train from Baltimore to Monongah for
the purpose. 320 Foreign embassies in Washington, D.C. sent
representatives to Monongah to look after the interests of their
various peoples. 321 In addition, the American Red Cross changed
its long-time policy of refusing assistance in man-made and
industrial disasters. 322 Even an open letter written by a local
bishop requesting aid circulated in thousands of American
MONONGAH MINES RELIEF FUND: IN AID OF SUFFERERS FROM THE MONONGAH
MINE EXPLOSION, WEST VIRGINIA 4-8 (Monongah Mines Relief Comm. 1910)
(listing the names of the identified victims by nationality, a substantial
majority of whom were immigrants from eastern and south-eastern Europe);
see also McATEER, supra note 303, at 14-15, 74-77 (stating that the workers in
Monongah were a hodgepodge of ethnic groups, as in the first decade of the
twentieth century, immigrants from central and southeastern Europe poured
into the United States). Companies preferred immigrants because they worked
in dangerous conditions for low pay and were difficult to unionize. Id. at 76.
The Monongah miners shared this ethnic diversity; the company even posted
notices at the entrance to the mine in seven languages. Id.
316. See DUANE LOCKARD, COAL: A MEMOIR AND CRITIQUE 64 (Univ. of Va.
Press 1998) (noting that some natives asserted that the mine explosion was
caused by "the large number of aliens. . . . The men are for the most part
illiterate, and of a lower standard of intelligence than their counterparts of
some years ago.").
317. CURRAN, supra note 301, at 62.
318. LOCKARD, supra note 316, at 64.
319. MCATEER, supra note 303, at 144.
320. CURRAN, supra note 301, at 62.
321. MCATEER, supra note 303, at 146
322. Id. at 175.
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newspapers. 323 Donations poured in from across the country. 324
Enough money was raised to distribute funds to the immediate
families of the victims, as well as those families of immigrants who
remained in Europe.325 The mining company offered to pay for
funeral expenses, but it offered only to compensate the victims'
families by giving one hundred fifty dollars for those that lost
adults, and seventy-five dollars for the families of victims under
the age of sixteen.326
The day after the explosion the county coroner 327 impaneled a
grand jury and charged it with the responsibility of ascertaining
"when, how and by what means . . . '[the victims] came to their
deaths."' 328 The grand jury exonerated the mine operator on
January 15, 1908,329 concluding-despite contrary testimony from
the director of the West Virginia Department of Mines that the
mines could have been safer-that methane gas and coal dust
levels were controlled "as far as were deemed practical."330 Given
the stranglehold that Consolidated Coal, through its Fairmont
Coal Company, had on the locality, with its effective ownership of
the town and everything in it, the public, including the governor of
West Virginia, expressed broad support for the mining company
immediately after the accident.331 A local pastor gave a sermon a
week after the accident in which he blamed human error for the
accident, noting the "increased sympathy" that existed "between
this community and the Fairmont Coal Company."332
2. Regulation of the Coal Industry before Monongah
American coal production began in earnest with the
development of coal mining in Western Pennsylvania near what
323. See id. at 178-79 (stating that letter and a subsequent letter, both
encouraging support of the victims, were circulated in nearly 2000 newspapers
throughout the country).
324. See id. at 180-85 (listing a variety contributing sources of relief aid).
325. Id. at 185.
326. CURRAN, supra note 301, at 64; see also LOCKARD, supra note 316, at
65-66 (responding to complaints that relief funds distributed to the families of
deceased miners were too low, the attorney for the Fairmont Coal Company
argued that '"The company has never contributed anything to persons here or
abroad otherwise as a gratuity or donation . . . I think the $2,000 distributed
principally among 41 children and 20 widows would be quite a Christmas
present.").
327. At the time, the county government was the only judicial system with
criminal or civil jurisdiction over the mine. MCATEER, supra note 303, at 199,
208.
328. Id. at 200.
329. Id. at 207.
330. Id. at 207-08.
331. CURRAN, supra note 301, at 63-64.
332. Id. at 63.
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would become Pittsburgh in the late-eighteenth century.333 The
nineteenth century saw a dramatic rise in American coal
production and consumption, 334 due in large part to the growing
scarcity of wood and the need for an alternative energy source,335
and the increased energy needs created by the nation's industrial
expansion, particularly the burgeoning railroad industry.336 Much
like other industries at the turn of the century, a handful of
companies dominated coal production.337 These companies exerted
enormous influence over the small towns throughout Appalachia
that produced labor for the mines as a result of their isolation and
the lack of other economic opportunities. 338 Coal companies
provided housing for workers, usually on the condition that they
continued their work for the company,339 and their leases often
included clauses prohibiting workers from entertaining
"objectionable" persons-union or union-sympathetic visitors-in
company homes.340
From 1800 to 1900, coal production in the United States
increased from 108,000 tons to 250 million tons, and then doubled
333. Id., at 18; see also LOCKARD, supra note 316, at 15-16 (noting that
during the eighteenth century, mines in Virginia and New England supplied
coal to Philadelphia and Pittsburgh).
334. CURRAN, supra note 301, at 18 ("In 1800, the United States' total coal
industrial output was just 108,000 tons. In a short span of forty years,
however, coal would replace wood as the United States' chief energy source.").
335. Id. at 19.
336. Id. at 20.
Railroads played a central role in the growth of the coal industry for
several reasons. First, as the railroad system grew, the demand for coal
increased rapidly. By the end of the nineteenth century, the railroad
system was the largest single consumer of bituminous coal.. . . Second,
the establishment of a national rail system resulted in a regional shift in
coal production. Mines had tended to be located near waterways or
major population centers. As railways developed, older coalfields could
be abandoned for areas with richer coal deposits ....
Id.; see also THOMAS G. ANDREWS, KILLING FOR COAL: AMERICA'S DEADLIEST
LABOR WAR 51-57 (Harvard Univ. Press 2008) (analyzing the relationship
between the railroads and the coal industry and noting that "[w]ithout
railroads, coal mining would have remained a marginal industry.").
337. CURRAN, supra note 301, at 25-26.
338. See id. at 28 (explaining that "approximately one half of those working
in the mines lived in company-owned dwellings. . . . 'The pure capitalist
mining community is therefore a company town in which the company is a
party to all the principal economic transactions carried on within it."'); see also
Wendy B. Davis, Out of the Black Hole: Reclaiming the Crown of King Coal, 51
AM. U. L. REV. 905, 914-16 (2002) (discussing the role of mining throughout
Appalachia in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries).
339. CURRAN, supra note 301, at 28-29.
340. Id. at 29; see also MCATEER, supra note 303, at 51-62 (describing the
dominant role of mining companies, through company housing, company
stores, and payment of scrip, in the economies of local mining communities).
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to 500 million tons in the first decade of the twentieth century.341
A symbiotic relationship between the railroad and coal industries
developed, which resulted in substantial political influence by the
railroad companies over the politics of coal, including policies
concerning unionization and safety regulation. 342 The period also
saw significant advances in coal mining technology, which served
to alter the status of the coal miners, who had previously been
relied on for their expertise in extracting coal, but were
increasingly reduced to following the machines and performing
somewhat simple tasks. 343 The industry continued to be quite
labor intensive, with the total coal mining workforce reaching as
high as four hundred thousand by 1900, but "[tihe mining skills of
the past were no longer necessary to gain employment
underground; all that was needed was a good back. Mechanization
had broadened the qualified labor force significantly."344
This dynamic further enhanced management power over their
workers, leading to low wages in comparison to profits, and
difficulties in unionization of the diverse, unskilled labor force,
which included African-American workers migrating from the
South, and Southern and Eastern Europeans emigrating from
abroad.345 In the 1860s, fledging mine workers unions were
founded, but they dissolved by the end of the decade; and labor
organizers experienced similar failures in the 1880s.346 But
publicity generated by the activities of some of these short-lived
unions resulted in increased "[p]ublic awareness of conditions in
the mines . . . [,] public support for the miners[,] and resentment
[toward] the industrialists . . . ."347 On January 25, 1890, two long-
time rival labor organizations merged to form the United Mine
Workers of America (UMWA), which, while representing only a
small portion of the total labor mining workforce (maybe as little
as five percent of the then four hundred throusand miners), soon
became the dominant labor bargaining agent in the coal
industry.348 The preamble of the UMWA constitution listed eleven
341. CURRAN, supra note 301, at 22.
342. Id. at 21-22.
343. See generally ANDREWS, supra note 336, at 93-96 (discussing the
transition from the use of skilled miners to unskilled laborers).
344. CURRAN, supra note 301, at 27; see also ANDREWS, supra note 336, at 96
(stating that "[t]he paradox of coal, then, was this: even as the introduction of
fossilized energy into transportation, gold and silver mining, metallurgy,
manufacturing, domestic technologies, and urban infrastructure was
'reduc[ing] human muscles to ... a marginal source of energy,' the provision of
the new energy forms remained utterly dependent on human brawn and
organic energy supplies.").
345. CURRAN, supra note 301, at 27.
346. Id. at 29-30.
347. Id. at 30.
348. Id. at 31; see also LOCKARD, supra note 316, at 115-20 (discussing the
historical development of the United Mine Workers of America and its early
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"objectives" including improving "working conditions and
[reducing] accidents and disasters in the mines."34 9
While it struggled at the outset to promote membership, the
UMWA staged a dramatic strike in 1897 with more than one
hundred thousand miners participating 350-including those at the
Monongah Mine-garnering significant political support in the
form of statements from three governors in the mining region.351
The strike was ultimately successful, securing a twenty-five
percent pay increase for miners and fostering a substantial
increase in union membership, rising to the level of more than two
hundred fifty thousand miners by the early 1900s. 352
Notwithstanding this success, however, the union was unable to
achieve one of its primary goals-unionization of miners in the
West Virginia coalfields.353 The hard-fought concessions also
focused almost exclusively on wage increases and did not address
workplace safety. 354 While the union did push for more health and
safety protections, it did not achieve the same kind of success with
federal government officials as it had with the coal companies over
wage concessions. Some union officials blamed public apathy for
the lack of government response to mine-related dangers.355
Work in the mines remained extremely hazardous during the
successes under John Mitchell).
349. CURRAN, supra note 301, at 32.
350. Id. at 38.
351. Id. at 39-40.
352. Id. at 40; see also BARBARA FREESE, COAL: A HUMAN HISTORY 140-41
(Perseus Publ'g 2003) (describing the success of the 1902 coal strike under the
leadership of John Mitchell).
353. CURRAN, supra note 301, at 41; see also McATEER, supra note 303, at
95-100 (noting the failure of the 1897 strike at the Monongah mines).
354. See CURRAN, supra note 301, at 43 (stating that "[tihe union's
membership grew at an unprecedented rate after the turn of the century.
More important for the workers were the concessions made by the operators in
the area of wages. The 1898 agreement marked the beginning of a steady
climb in compensation for miners, a rise that continued into the late 1920s.").
355. Id. at 57.
The daily press simply records the event in a matter-of-fact manner,
and, after expressing the usual formal sympathy, dismisses the subject
entirely without any appeal for better conditions, an investigation or
other manifestation of interest, and the public . . . are disposed to look
upon this as a visitation from God upon those whose lot it is to enter the
dark and gloomy caverns of the earth in search of her treasures, and the
whole affair is dropped from view.
See id. (agreeing with the UMWA analysis and further stating that "[tihe
routine nature of mining deaths, the hidden character of coal mining fatalities
relative to other industries . . . meant few people recognized that mining was
the nation's most dangerous occupation. Lawmakers tended to address the
visible problems first, since they were in the public eye."); see also Davis,
supra note 338, at 907-08 (describing Appalachia as a "colony" of the
industrial Northeast for which the people of Appalachia deserve reparations).
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period. 356 In 1900 alone, a total of 1489 miners died in coal mines
in the United States.351 During the first decade of the twentieth
century, as coal production increased, so too did the fatalities and
injures in American mines.35 8 In a 1900 assessment of the nature
and extent of safety concerns in the American mining industry, a
mine inspector observed that:
Those calamitous disasters which startle us so frequently, sweeping
away, instantaneously, valuable lives by the tens and even by the
hundreds, are having a dreadful effect, and in fact the finer
sensibilities of the public generally have become shocked or almost
paralyzed at their frequency . . . . [D]uring such distressing events
we have, as usual, a plenteous crop of apologists and general utility
men who appear upon the surface . . . bringing panacea healing for
all our illsFalse However much these alarming mine explosions may
shock the people generally and cause distress in so many homes
simultaneously, yet the blighting social effects caused by such
incidents sink in insignificance when we compare the number of
deaths resulting therefrom, with the number of fatalities resulting
from other causes which happen one by one and in such a manner as
356. See Alison D. Morantz, Mining Mining Data: Bringing Empirical
Analysis to Bear on the Regulation of Safety and Health in U.S. Mining, 111
W. VA. L. REV. 45, 46 (2008) (stating that "[i]n part, the industry's unique
salience is explained by its unique hazards: for much of the 20th century,
mining was one of the most dangerous occupations."). Also, contemporary
observers understood the distinct dangers of coal mining. A 1902 report to
President Roosevelt stated:
Coal mining is more hazardous than any other class of underground
work, for in addition to the usual dangers from falling rock and
premature blasts, the coal miner runs risk of fire, explosion, and
suffocation. The temporary shutting off of the supply of air may place in
jeopardy the life of every worker in a coal mine. The flame from a
'blown-out' shot may explode a mixture of gas, or dust and air, and
result in the death or injury of many men. The danger of tapping a gas
pocket is always present ....
ANTHRACITE COAL STRIKE COMM'N, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON THE
ANTHRACITE COAL STRIKE OF MAY-OCTOBER, 1902 27 (Cornell Univ. Library
2009).
357. Mining Safety & Health Admin., Coal Fatalities for 1900 to 2009,
http://www.msh a.gov/stats/centurystats/coalstats.asp (last visited Apr. 19,
2011); see also LOCKARD, supra note 316, at 53-54 (stating that "[iln the first
three decades of this century an average of 2,210 miners were killed each year.
Part of the reason for this toll of death underground is that coal mining is
inherently dangerous. If the roof doesn't fall and crush you, you are
endangered by clumsy machinery swinging around in restricted space in poor
light and obscuring clouds of coal dust. And if that doesn't get you, there is
danger lurking in high-voltage cables and in escaping gases that are poisonous
or explosive. It is therefore not surprising that historically coal mining has
been the worst of American industries in its rate of accidental death and
injury.").
358. LOCKARD, supra note 316, at 53; see also Davis, supra note 338, at 946-
47 (stating that "[b]etween 1930 and 1972, a total of 1.5 million miners were
injured in the mines.").
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to escape public notice or compassion.359
Information presented to Congress documented the increase
in coal related deaths at the turn of the century, but demonstrated
that only a small portion of these deaths were caused by what
would be considered a dramatic mining "disaster," with only 6.6
percent of mining deaths at the end of the 1890s, and 17.1 percent
at the beginning of the 1900s, arising from large scale explosions
or other more conspicuous occurrences.360
Another important dynamic of the time was the comparative
rate of mining injuries and fatalities in the United States as
compared to other industrialized nations. Fatality rates in U.S.
coal mines were consistently higher in this period than those in
Belgium, Great Britain, and Germany.361 And the death rates in
these nations were declining at the same time that the rates in the
U.S. were increasing dramatically. 362 Daniel Curran postulates
that this phenomenon can be explained by "the earlier
establishment of trade unions and . . . national mine safety laws"
in the other industrialized nations.363
359. CURRAN, supra note 301, at 49-50.
360. Id. at 50.
361. Id. at 50.
362. Id. at 52. ("The rate in Germany, for example, dropped from 2.86 per
thousand in 1898 to 1.71 per thousand in 1908, whereas the U.S. fatality rate
rose from 2.59 to 3.64 during the same period."); see also McATEER, supra note
303, at 243-44 (stating that "[ilt is very doubtful whether natural conditions in
any other country in the world are as favorable as in the United States for
getting out coal with the minimum amount of danger to [the] workmen
employed.. . . Yet during the five years that preceded Monongah, the United
States had the highest rate of deaths per ton of coal produced by any major
producer. Mines in the United States killed an average of 3.39 miners per
thousand employed each year, compared to 2.06 for Prussia, 1.28 for Great
Britain, 1.00 for Belgium, and .91 for France.").
363. CURRAN, supra note 301, at 52; see also McATEER, supra note 303, at
244 (citing a report contemporary to Monongah that explained the
disproportionate fatalities in American mines as caused by "the lack of proper
and enforceable mining regulations, and in part to the lack of reliable
information concerning the explosives used and the conditions under which
they could be used safely."); but see LOCKARD, supra note 316, at 57-60
(postulating that coal operators viewed American miners as more expendable
than their British counterparts and that "[tihe United Mine Workers of
America emphasized the pay envelope and neglected safety except to talk
about it strategically, whereas the [British] National Union of Miners sought
pay increases but had to settle for safety. Great Britain could not afford wages
like those in America but found safety less expensive; American companies
could afford both but chose to put off spending for safety until political
developments in the 1970s compelled some action-at last."). The first
relevant national legislation in England was characterized by its hostility to
workers and the labor movement, with late-eighteenth century laws like the
1769 Malicious Injuries Act, which imposed penalties for miners who damaged
equipment or stole coal, and the Combination Laws and Act of 1799 and 1800,
which criminalized all trade unions and worker-organizing activities. CURRAN,
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In the United States, however, the progress toward
comprehensive mine safety regulation occurred later, more slowly,
and with less success. Although the first national proposal for
mine safety regulation came in 1865 with the proposal of a bill in
Congress to set up a Federal Mining Bureau, it never became
law.364 Curran cites two reasons for the lack of effective national
regulation during the nineteenth century: first, that the "states
were autonomous in their handling of the coal industry and were
responsible for the administration of programs within their
domain, with minimal interference from Washington,"3 65 and
second, that the habitual and frequent occurrence of mining
accidents resulting from routine circumstances and involving
relatively few deaths
Seemed ... somehow less worthy of public attention than the great
disasters. The routine nature of [the] mining deaths, the hidden
character of the coal mining fatalities relative to other industries
(like railroading, where spectacular accidents drew national
attention), meant few people recognized that mining was the
nation's most dangerous occupation. Lawmakers tended to address
the visible problems first, since they were in the public eye.366
supra note 301, at 52-53; see also Bridget Montgomery, Comment, The
European Community's Draft Fifth Directive: British Resistance and
Community Procedures, 10 COMP. LAB. L.J. 429, 441-43 (1989) (discussing the
hostile legal response to trade unions in nineteenth century England). A
generation later, in 1824 and 1825, laws were passed that repealed the
Combination Laws and other repressive anti-labor provisions, and in a climate
of significant and growing labor agitation, the English government stepped in
to diminish labor unrest in an industry of increasing importance to the
national economy by addressing some of the concerns expressed by workers.
CURRAN, supra note 301, at 53-54; see also Ulrich Mueckenberger,
Juridification of Industrial Relations: A German-British Comparison, 9 COMP.
LAB. L.J. 526, 546-47 (1976) (noting Parliament's repeal of the Combination
Acts and providing legal recognition and protections of unions). An explosion
in a mine in Northeast England that killed fifty-two workers is commonly
credited for fostering the first national mine safety legislation in 1842,
followed in close succession by several other similar laws. CURRAN, supra note
301, at 54-55; see also FREESE, supra note 352, at 77-78 (describing the work
conditions of child miners and parliamentary investigations into their use).
364. CURRAN, supra note 301, at 56.
365. Id. at 56; see also MCATEER, supra note 303, at 245-46 (stating that
"[iun 1907, the regulation of safety and health risks in mines was the
jurisdiction of the state, with no federal involvement. As a result, a patchwork
of legislation existed that reflected, among other factors, the relative political
influence of the mining industry in particular states and whether there were
balanced interests of labor organizations and industry.").
366. CURRAN, supra note 301, at 57; see also McATEER, supra note 303, at
245 (noting that coal operators had regularly argued that coal mining was
inherently dangerous and therefore enhanced regulation would not increase
worker safety); LOCKARD, supra note 316, at 58-59 (stating that "[o]ne possible
reason is the composition of the American mine work force. American miners
in the late nineteenth century were mainly ... mountaineers, immigrants, and
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Curran cites a portion of the 1900 UMWA journal to
demonstrate the contemporary awareness of this phenomenon and
its impact on the development of mine safety regulation: "One
astounding and alarming feature in connection with . . . mine
catastrophes . . . is the apparent indifference upon the part of
those directly affected and the public in general."367
In 1891, the United States government passed the first
national mine safety legislation, but it applied only to mining in
U.S. territories and did not regulate mining within the forty-four
states of the Union.368 During the same period, a new initiative in
support of comprehensive regulation was promoted by the owners
and operators of coal mines. Public choice scholars have responded
to these initiatives by noting that "[t]he need to ensure a stable
work force was one factor influencing this dramatic transition.
Another factor was that coal operators realized federal regulations
would serve their interests by circumventing existing state safety
legislation, which was often incompatible with the expanding
national market."369 The coal mining interests sought to promote
the promulgation of mining safety regulation on terms and under
conditions they could control and that would promote, as opposed
to hinder, their long-term financial objectives. 370 Shortly before the
turn of the century, the American Mining Congress, an
organization of coal mining operators, proposed and lobbied to
Congress for its passage of a wide-ranging set of mine safety
regulations, including the creation of a federal Bureau of Mines. 71
In the relatively "progressive" political climate of the early
1900s, when conditions were somewhat favorable for some kind of
mine safety regulation, the pace and significance of mine accidents
began to accelerate, 72 moving "the formerly underpublicized
blacks, and all three were looked down upon to some degree by most other
Americans.... [Tihere was a seemingly inexhaustible supply of recruits from
the Appalachian mountain country, the South, and abroad; and though they
died in the thousands every year, replacements always seemed ready to fill the
diminished ranks.").
367. CURRAN, supra note 301, at 57.
368. Id. at 57.
369. Id. at 59.
370. As articulated by American Mining Congress president J.H Richards in
1904: "We therefore affirm that if a Department of Mines and Mining could
broaden the markets for the products of our mines ... such accomplishments
would create a new atmosphere and a new hope. . . ." Id. at 60.
371. Id. at 59-60 ('The motivation of these operators had little to do with
coal mining safety: rather, they were concerned with the aid an agency could
provide in the production and discovery of mineral resources.").
372. Id. at 64-65.
The rapid increase in major mining accidents can be linked primarily to
a series of production changes in the coal industry. The introduction of
undercutting machinery greatly altered the skill level required for mine
workers . . . . Mine operators increasingly placed a premium on
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industry into the public spotlight."3 73 From 1905 to 1910 there
were eighty-five major mine accidents in the U.S. resulting in
2640 deaths, with the total deaths from all mining accidents in the
period reaching 12,664.374 The worst of these years was 1907, the
year of Monongah and other disastrous accidents.375
3. Regulation of the Coal Industry after Monongah
The national political response to the Monongah incident took
on a strikingly different character than the decidedly pro-
management attitude in the Fairmont area. In the days after the
incident, newspapers published editorials arguing "loss of life
should no longer be considered a part of the cost of doing business
in the expanding economy."376 The argument by coal operators
against increased regulation-that mining was an inherently
dangerous activity-was coming under serious scrutiny for the
first time.377 The Governor of West Virginia reacted by calling the
legislature into session, raising concerns among the coal operators
that the state would enact serious mining regulations.378 But
despite some support from the ex-governor and even an owner of
the Monongah mine, West Virginia failed to pass any substantial
safety legislation in the wake of the disaster, in large part because
of substantial opposition from coal operators. 379
Despite this local victory, organized coal interests, sensing at
least the threat of possible federal regulation, established the West
Virginia Mining Association to lobby Congress. 380 The
Association's express objectives were to seek appropriation of
funds to research mining disasters, a resolution stating that the
causes of mine disasters was unknown, and a resolution that the
federal government should not act until the specific causes of mine
disasters were established.381
productivity, a strategy that simultaneously encouraged carelessness
through production initiative. This production orientation brought with
it a greater use of explosives or blown-out shots, which increased the
likelihood of disaster.
Id.
373. CURRAN, supra note 301, at 61.
374. Id. at 61 ("By far the worst coal mining year was 1907. From all causes,
over 3,000 perished with 8 separate explosions killing 1,148 miners.").
375. Id. at 64. Just two weeks after the Monongah disaster, a mining
accident in Jacobs Creek, Pennsylvania, killed 239 more miners.
376. McATEER, supra note 303, at 245.
377. Id.; see also LOCKARD, supra note 316, at 61 (calling the traditional
view, that even union leaders shared, that mining was simply a dangerous
activity, "fatalistic").
378. McATEER, supra note 303, at 245.
379. Id.
380. Id. at 253.
381. Id. at 253. President Roosevelt supported this goal, stating "[t]he loss of
life in the mines is appalling. The larger part of these losses of life and
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The first national mine safety regulation, the Organic Act,
passed on May 16th, 1910.382 The Act identified its intent as "the
improvement of the safety and working environment in the
mineral industries" and created the Bureau of Mines as part of the
Department of the Interior to promote this goal.383 At least one
scholar hailed the creation of the Bureau of Mines as a significant
advancement in the safety regulation of the mining industry,384
and pointed to the Monongah disaster as the "trigger" for its
development.385
But the functions of the Bureau of Mines were limited to
investigation, education, training, and "research intended to assist
and advise the mining industry, rather than police it."386 The Act
provided no provision for inspecting working conditions and
expressly barred Bureau employees "any right or authority in
connection with the inspection or supervision of mines . . . in any
state."387 The Bureau would not be granted any inspection
authority by Congress for another forty-two years, and in the
intervening period, its "effectiveness in improving the working
environment in the mines was less than spectacular."388
Congressman James Tawney of Minnesota asked during debate:
"Has [the agency's mission] anything to do with the safety of the
people engaged in mining? Who are the beneficiaries of this work if
performed by the bureau of mines and mining? The owners of the
great coal mines." 389 As Daniel Curran observes in his history of
the politics of mine safety legislation, the 1911 budget allocation
for the bureau was only for $505,200, with a low salary allocated
for the director (a fact that limited the pool of qualified
candidates).390
The development of a lax regulatory framework,39' in the
property can be avoided. It is of the utmost importance that a Bureau of Mines
be established . .. to reduce the loss of life in mines ..... Id. at 254.
382. CURRAN, supra note 301, at 66.
383. Id.; see also Organic Act, Pub. L. No. 61-179, 36 Stat. 369-70 (1910)
(detailing the Act).
384. See J. Davitt McAteer, Mine Safety and Health: A Formula for
Continued Success, 96 W. VA. L. REV. 847 (1994) (discussing the Federal Coal
Mine Safety Act).
385. Morantz, supra note 356, at 46.
386. CURRAN, supra note 301, at 67; see also Organic Act, Pub. L. No. 61-179,
§ 2, 36 Stat. 369-70 (1910) (stating that "it shall be the province and duty of
said bureau and its director . . . to make diligent investigation of the methods
of mining, especially in relation to the safety of the miners . . . .").
387. CURRAN, supra note 301, at 67 (quoting Organic Act, Pub. L. No. 61-
179, § 5, 36 Stat. 369-70 (1910)).
388. CURRAN, supra note 301, at 67.
389. Id. at 68.
390. Id. at 67.
391. Id. at 68 ('The Organic Act of 1910, with its emphasis on production
over safety, was clearly inadequate to safeguard the lives of miners. More than
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wake of Monongah can be explained with reference to various
factors. First, there were insufficient political structures in place
to take advantage of any legislative opportunities the disaster may
have provided. Unlike New York in 1911 at the time of the
Triangle fire, there were no experienced and reasonably well-
financed and organized activists already working the halls of the
state legislature with substantial numbers of progressive political
allies, albeit mostly unsuccessfully, seeking the kind of regulatory
changes for which the Triangle fire graphically demonstrated the
need. In the absence of the same kind of political force, the natural
impulse to "do something" or at least to be perceived as "doing
something" after Monongah resulted in a weak and almost entirely
cosmetic initiative that did little, if anything, to make coal mining
more safe. 392
In addition, the way in which the story of Monongah
specifically, and mining fatalities in general, was told and
understood helped to foster the tepid regulatory response. The
dominant narrative associated with the disaster, and other similar
catastrophes, did not provide the kind of argument for regulatory
or governmental innovation produced by either the Triangle fire or
the Mississippi flood. The coal companies and their lobbying
operation were remarkably successful at communicating the
message that coal mining accidents were caused by the
carelessness-or even willful misdeeds--of the miners
themselves.393 The creation of the Bureau of Mines, followed from
this storyline.394 The legislation flowed from "the philosophy of the
operators who were instrumental in its passage. 'Mine accidents
result from the carelessness of the miner."'395 This view, which
provided the conceptual basis for the "regulatory" structure
contemplated by the Organic Act "was echoed in the press and
espoused by businessmen and professionals in the scientific
community."396 "Drunkenness and lingual or intellectual disability
seventy thousand minders were to die during the next forty years."); see also
Mining Safety & Health Admin., Coal Fatalities for 1900 to 2009,
http://www.msha.gov/stats/centurystats/coalstat s.asp (last visited Apr. 19,
2011) (indicating that miner fatalities did not consistently fall below 1000
until 1949).
392. Congress created an agency to research production that was powerless
in the area of safety and was "clearly inadequate to safeguard the lives of
miners." CURRAN, supra note 301, at 67-68. Soon after the passage of the
Organic Act, Federal concern over conditions in the mindin industry faded. Id.
at 69.
393. Id. at 67.
394. See supra note 394 to infra note 402 and accompanying text (explaining
the creation of the Bureau of Mines).
395. CURRAN, supra note 301, at 67.
396. Id. ("A statement in the Coal Trade Bulletin epitomized this position,
posting without data, that 99 percent of all mine accidents 'are due absolutely
to the carelessness or willful negligence of the men employed in them [sic].").
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or illiteracy, particularly among the large number of immigrant
miners, were other factors cited by the operators as the cause of
accidents."397 And the coal miners union, which viewed recent
immigrant workers as competitors as opposed to potential union
members,398 was complicit in the development of this narrative,
concurring implicitly with the association of blame with the
relative incapacity of the immigrant miners, about whom the
union generally took a negative view given their use for
undermining their organizing efforts through strike-breaking and
other means.399
Other atmospheric factors played a role. While the Triangle
fire occurred in the heart of the most densely populated city in the
United States, Monongah, as dramatic and horrific as the stories
were, and as broadly disseminated, occurred in a rural and
isolated area, and was witnessed by few people not already
painfully aware of the dangers inherent in the industry. And even
for those on the site at the time of the accident, it happened in an
instant, and the deaths occurred almost completely out of sight of
any survivors or bystanders, unlike the drawn out and public
drama in Washington Square Park in 1911.
And while the sense that a dramatic event might recur
without some sort of regulatory response likely had an impact on
the impetus for administrative evolution in response to the
Triangle fire and Mississippi flood, the sense that coal mining is so
inherently dangerous by its nature-in the dark, underground,
with explosives-that a certain inevitability of further incidents
limited the initiative on the part of legislators to propose
regulatory imperatives that were likely perceived as having little
ability to foretell the unavoidable likelihood of future and
continued loss of life in the coal mining industry.400
397. Id.
398. The diversity of the increasingly immigrant workforce, language
difficulties, and antipathy of race hindered union organization. Id. at 27.
399. CURRAN, supra note 301, at 68.
400. For a discussion of the inherently dangerous nature of the coal mining
industry in the context of the Massey Mine disaster in West Virginia, see the
transcript of interview of U.S. Congressman George Miller on Countdown with
Keith Olbermann, taped on April 15, 2010:
O'Donnell: Congressman, as you know, mining has always been our
most dangerous occupation. The most dangerous work you can do in this
country, far more dangerous than law enforcement. And yet Congress
seems to have allowed, over decades and decades of these kinds of
disasters, for this lax enforcement to continue. What is it that Congress
can't get a-hold of here .. .?
Miller: You've got to recognize the power of the economic interest. Let's
not pretend-you were in Washington. You know the power of coal, coal
state representatives. And when push comes to shove, there's a tendency
to go with the industry, with some wonderful exceptions in
representatives. But the fact is that the power of coal, they control in
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In comparison to the Triangle fire at least, the demographics
of the victims of Monongah cannot be ignored in assessing its
relative lack of impact on the regulatory dynamic. The victims of
the Triangle fire were mostly young women, and the nature of the
regulatory response indicates the importance of this fact to the
legislators who were influenced by the disaster. The overwhelming
majority of the post-Triangle regulatory reforms provided limits
and protections for women and child labor. As noted above, the
narrative of the Triangle fire was dominated by the loss of young,
female life, and, most likely by a sense among many that young
girls had no business in these kinds of workplaces, if they belonged
in the workforce at all, and that it was certainly a particularly
objectionable kind of tragedy for them to die in such a place. The
victims of the explosions and fire at Monongah were almost all
men or boys. There was no comparable sense of an additional
tragedy that the deaths of more than one hundred young women
would produce less than five years later in New York City.
Significant coal mine safety legislation, and a related increase
in mine safety,401 did finally come, in the form of the Coal Mine
Health and Safety (CMHS) Act,402 but not until more than sixty
years after the incident at Monongah. The CMHS Act of 1969
provided some of the more credible regulatory structures absent in
the post-Monongah initiatives, empowering inspectors "not only to
inspect coal mines but also to issue monetary and criminal
penalties for statutory violations," and has been credited with
"heralding a new era of federal regulation" above and beyond the
these communities. They control the livelihood. They control the
economics. They want to control it like it's the 1800's, as opposed to
2010 .... But the fact of the matter is the law is inadequate to provide
the kind of protection that these miners are entitled to. It's just that
simple. The law is inadequate. And everybody recognizes the loopholes,
the regulators, the mining companies, the unions, the workers, the
Congress. And so maybe now we have a catalyst where we can get rid of
the loopholes and have a law that leads to safer and safer mining
practices.
'Countdown with Keith Olbermann' for Thurs., Apr. 15th, 2010, MSNBC TV,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/36645334/ns/msnbc_tv-countdown .withkeith
olbermann/ (last visited Apr. 19, 2011).
401. Morantz, supra note 356, at 46.
402. See Coal Mine Health and Safety Act, 30 U.S.C. §§ 801-804 (2000)
(establishing several critical components to effective mine regulation). The
legislation applied to all mines, regardless of size, that generated coal entering
commerce. Id. § 803. It also required the promulgation of mine safety
standards, as well as firmly established the right of federal mine inspectors to
regularly enter private mines. Id. §§ 101(a) and 103(a), (b)(1) and (g). See also
Morantz, supra note 356, at 48 (noting that "[b]y most accounts, the passage of
this comprehensive regulatory scheme was a marked success. The sharp
decline in mining fatality rates that characterized most of the 1970s has
generally been attributed to the deterrent impact of federal regulation.").
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mining industry.403 The Act has led at least one mine safety
advocacy group to observe that the last thirty-five years have been
the safest in the American coal mining industry-citing only
sixteen "coal mine disasters" from 1976 to 2010, as compared to
thirty-five between 1951 and 1975, and 147 between 1926 and
1950.404
But these more recent developments have not prevented
mining disasters in the decades since the CMHS,405 as
demonstrated by a vivid recent example. On April 5, 2010, at the
Upper Big Branch Mine in Montcoal, West Virginia, an explosion
tore apart the mine and ultimately killed twenty-nine miners.406
The Upper Big Branch Mine, and its owners, Massey Energy, had
a history of safety violations.407 It had been evacuated three times
in the two months prior to the blast due to unsafe levels of
methane,408 and a subsidiary of the management company was
required to pay record safety fines after pleading guilty to
violations that resulted in the death of two miners.409 Despite
miners' warnings to public officials, violations doubled in 2008
compared to those in 2007.410 In response to a myriad of attacks in
the mainstream media, Massey officials defended their actions by
echoing the familiar refrain of citing the inherent danger in coal
mining.411 Massey Chief Executive Don L. Blankenship stated that
"[v]iolations are unfortunately a normal part of the mining
process."412 The New York Times presented a similar note of
fatalism: "In an age of robotically assembled automobiles and
pilotless drones, extracting coal remains a stubbornly labor
intensive and dangerous enterprise."413 Eventually, observers
403. Morantz, supra note 356, at 46-47.
404. See United States Mine Rescue Ass'n, Historical Data on [Coal] Mine
Disasters in the United States, saxsewell/historical.htm (last visited Apr. 19,
2011).
405. Id. Other recent mining disasters, including Sago in 2006 (twelve
miners were killed in an explosion in Tallmasville, West Virginia, on January
2), Huntington and Crandall Canyon in 2007 (six miners died in a collapse on
August 6, and three more rescue workers were killed in a subsequent collapse
on August 16 in Huntington, Utah), Jim Walter No. 5 Mine in 2001 (thirteen
miners died in an explosion in Brookwood, Alabama, on September 23), and
Wilberg Mine in 1984 (twenty-seven miners died in a fire in Orangeville,
Utah, on December 19).
406. See EDITORIAL, Lessons From the Big Branch Tragedy, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
14, 2010, at A26 (stating that the death toll of twenty-nine was "the nation's
worst mining disaster in four decades.").
407. Ian Urbina & Michael Cooper, Deaths at West Virginia Mine Raise






413. Bill Marsh, Where Running for Cover is Part of the Job, N.Y. TIMES,
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scrutinized the agency charged with regulating the mining
industry, describing the Mining Safety and Health Administration
as "fundamentally weak"-lacking key tools such as subpoena
power-and applying timid enforcement. 414
Some observers have suggested that the continued level of
risk of serious injury associated with coal mining might relate as
much to a lack of sufficient regulation as to the unavoidable
dangers inherent in the process. 415 United States Representative
George Miller, Chairman of the House Education and Labor
Committee, has noted that the coal companies retain
extraordinary influence over Congress and regulators, especially
those elected officials who represent coal communities.416 This
influence can be found in the same relationships and structures
that foster private interest hyper-influence on agency policy
making and enforcement across the spectrum of the
administrative state-control and dissemination of information
and the "revolving door" of personnel between industry on one
hand and legislatures and agencies on the other.417
Apr. 11, 2010, at WK3.
414. Michael Cooper et al., In Mine Safety, a Meek Watchdog, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 11, 2010, at Al.
415. See, e.g., Arianna Huffington, The West Virginia Mining Disaster and
the Financial Crisis ... , HUFFINGTON POST, Apr. 12, 2010, www.huffingtonpo
st.com/arianna-huffington/the-west-virginia-mining-b_534665.html (last
visited Apr. 19, 2011) (stating that "[o]fficials say it's too soon to pinpoint the
exact cause of the tragic explosion at the Upper Big Branch mine in West
Virginia that took the lives to 29 miners, but we certainly know enough to
identify the root cause. It's the same cause that led to the 2007 Crandall
Canyon mine disaster in Utah that killed six miners and three rescue workers.
It's the same cause that led to the 2006 Sago mine disaster in West Virginia
that killed 12 miners. And it's also the same cause that led to the Lehman
Brothers disaster, the Citigroup disaster, the bursting of the housing bubble,
and the implosion of our financial system: a badly broken regulatory system.").
416. See Transcript, Countdown with Keith Olbermann, Apr. 15, 2010,
MSNBC TV, 'Countdown with Keith Olbermann' for Thurs., Apr. 15th, 2010,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/36645334/ns/msnbc-tv-countdowwith keith_
olbermann/ (last visited Apr. 19, 2010).
417. See, Kimberly Kindy & Dan Eggen, W VA Mine Disaster Calls
Attention to Revolving Door Between Industry, Government, WASH. POST, Apr.
18, 2010, at Al (noting that "more than 200 former congressional staff
members, federal regulators and lawmakers are employed by the mining
industry as lobbyists, consultants or senior executives . . . ." Finally, modern
observers arrived at conclusions past students of the Monongah disaster would
eventually reach. Id. First, "[w]hat is clear is that federal oversight of the
industry must be greatly strengthened." Lessons from the Big Branch Tragedy,
supra note 406, at A26. Second, the disaster was preventable. EDITORIAL, It
Appears that the W Va. Mine Disaster Could Have Been Averted, WASH. POST,
Apr. 10, 2010, at A 16. Third, "[t]he 29 people killed last week in the West
Virginia coal-mine explosion will soon be as forgotten by the nation as are the
362 miners who were killed in a 1907 explosion in that state, the worst mining
disaster in American history." George F. Will, This Nuclear Option is Nuclear,




The dynamics created by dramatic public events constitute a
blunt and imprecise instrument to foster administrative change.
Most dramatic negative events have a long list of proximate
causes, and the true role of each in ultimately leading to the
tragedy is rarely clear. The impact that these events ultimately
have on the regulatory regime is often determined by the
dominant interpretation of the events and its causes, by the
particular risk of future harm that is most effectively
communicated in their aftermath, and the political context in
place at the time. This multiplicity of relevant factors has resulted
in a mixed record for the relative effectiveness of regulatory
evolution that can be connected in some causal way to a dramatic
initiating event.
Those events that do play a measurable role in fostering
regulatory change or development appear to share some defining
similarities. First, is the tragic and harmful impact of the event
and the possibility or likelihood that something like it could
happen again. Second, is the lack of an existing legal structure-
criminal or regulatory in nature-that can address this future risk
and provide some just resolution for the tragic event. Third, is the
presence of an existing political movement or structure that has a
set of regulatory initiatives in mind and is on the verge of
successful advocacy for them at the time of the tragic event. And
finally, the existence and perpetuation of a clear, understandable
narrative regarding the tragedy that provides the popular impetus
for regulatory change that is seen by enough people and
appropriate to withstand the political realities that usually serve
to prevent any meaningful regulatory development at the
measurable expense of the dominant private interests that
effectively command much of the policy formation in this country.
One potential consequence of this punctuated equilibrium
model of administrative evolution is that the pace of
administrative change may be expected to increase over time, if
only because of the ever-increasing "public" nature of our society.
The explosion of information technology and media entities that
utilize it has already resulted in a far greater potential for events
to have a broad public impact no matter when or where they occur.
A power outage in New York becomes a national news story,
potentially enhancing the perceived risk caused by aging power
generation technology to an extent that would have been
impossible without national news networks and the Internet. The
Triangle fire could not have had the impact it did in 1911 if it had
happened in Pittsburgh, or even in a more out of the way part of
New York at a different time of day. But there is no real limit in
-is-nuclear.html.
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today's media-saturated climate to where and when the next
dramatic event, producing the next unresolvable regulatory
moment, might occur.
